* [PATCH] firewire: nosy: Fix a use-after-free bug in nosy_ioctl()
@ 2021-04-03 6:58 Zheyu Ma
2021-04-03 7:06 ` Greg KH
2021-04-03 16:05 ` Linus Torvalds
0 siblings, 2 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Zheyu Ma @ 2021-04-03 6:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stefanr; +Cc: linux1394-devel, linux-kernel, security, greg, Zheyu Ma
For each device, the nosy driver allocates a pcilynx structure.
A use-after-free might happen in the following scenario:
1. Open nosy device for the first time and call ioctl with command
NOSY_IOC_START, then a new client A will be malloced and added
to doubly linked list.
2. Open nosy device for the second time and call ioctl with command
NOSY_IOC_START, then a new client B will be malloced and added
to doubly linked list.
3. Call ioctl with command NOSY_IOC_START for client A, then client A
will be readded to the doubly linked list. Now the doubly linked
list is messed up.
4. Close the first nosy device and nosy_release will be called.
In nosy_release, client A will be unlinked and freed.
5. Close the second nosy device, and client A will be referenced,
resulting in UAF.
The root cause of this bug is that the element in the doubly linked list
is reentered into the list.
Fix this bug by adding a check before inserting a client. If a client
is already in the linked list, don't insert it.
The following KASAN report reveals it:
[ 14.672676 ] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in nosy_release+0x1ea/0x210
[ 14.673113 ] Write of size 8 at addr ffff888102ad7360 by task poc
[ 14.673609 ] CPU: 3 PID: 337 Comm: poc Not tainted 5.12.0-rc5+ #6
[ 14.673988 ] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009),
BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 14.674686 ] Call Trace:
[ 14.674843 ] dump_stack+0x8a/0xb5
[ 14.675061 ] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x18/0x130
[ 14.675428 ] ? nosy_release+0x1ea/0x210
[ 14.675676 ] ? nosy_release+0x1ea/0x210
[ 14.675916 ] kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x111
[ 14.676169 ] ? nosy_release+0x1ea/0x210
[ 14.676409 ] nosy_release+0x1ea/0x210
[ 14.676642 ] __fput+0x1e2/0x840
[ 14.676844 ] task_work_run+0xe8/0x180
[ 14.677083 ] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x114/0x120
[ 14.677388 ] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x40
[ 14.677678 ] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 14.677995 ] RIP: 0033:0x7fc5a8666f30
[ 14.678229 ] Code: 00 64 c7 00 0d 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff eb 90
b8 ff ff ff ff eb 89 0f 1f 40 00 83 3d d9 27 2c 00 00 75 10 b8 03
00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e84
[ 14.679385 ] RSP: 002b:00007ffe9e94cd68 EFLAGS: 00000246
ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003
[ 14.679862 ] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000
RCX: 00007fc5a8666f30
[ 14.680301 ] RDX: 00007ffe9e94ce78 RSI: 0000000000002601
RDI: 0000000000000004
[ 14.680743 ] RBP: 00007ffe9e94cd80 R08: 0000564727400850
R09: 00007fc5a8939ba0
[ 14.681180 ] R10: 0000000000000692 R11: 0000000000000246
R12: 0000564727400610
[ 14.681624 ] R13: 00007ffe9e94ce60 R14: 0000000000000000
R15: 0000000000000000
[ 14.682072 ]
[ 14.682168 ] Allocated by task 337:
[ 14.682387 ] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
[ 14.682633 ] __kasan_kmalloc+0x7a/0x90
[ 14.682868 ] nosy_open+0x154/0x4d0
[ 14.683089 ] misc_open+0x2ec/0x410
[ 14.683313 ] chrdev_open+0x20d/0x5a0
[ 14.683541 ] do_dentry_open+0x40f/0xe80
[ 14.683787 ] path_openat+0x1cf9/0x37b0
[ 14.684025 ] do_filp_open+0x16d/0x390
[ 14.684253 ] do_sys_openat2+0x11d/0x360
[ 14.684497 ] __x64_sys_open+0xfd/0x1a0
[ 14.684736 ] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
[ 14.684964 ] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 14.685283 ]
[ 14.685384 ] Freed by task 337:
[ 14.685580 ] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
[ 14.685822 ] kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30
[ 14.686062 ] kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30
[ 14.686324 ] __kasan_slab_free+0xe5/0x110
[ 14.686581 ] kfree+0x8f/0x210
[ 14.686775 ] nosy_release+0x158/0x210
[ 14.687011 ] __fput+0x1e2/0x840
[ 14.687213 ] task_work_run+0xe8/0x180
[ 14.687449 ] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x114/0x120
[ 14.687750 ] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x40
[ 14.688040 ] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 14.688356 ]
[ 14.688454 ] The buggy address belongs to the object at
ffff888102ad7300
[ 14.688454 ] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128
[ 14.689232 ] The buggy address is located 96 bytes inside of
[ 14.689232 ] 128-byte region [ffff888102ad7300, ffff888102ad7380)
[ 14.689955 ] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 14.690258 ] page:0000000046ca3dc1 refcount:1 mapcount:0
mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888102ad7100 pfn:0x102ad6
[ 14.690917 ] head:0000000046ca3dc1 order:1 compound_mapcount:0
[ 14.691278 ] flags: 0x200000000010200(slab|head)
[ 14.691562 ] raw: 0200000000010200 dead000000000100
dead000000000122 ffff8881000428c0
[ 14.692044 ] raw: ffff888102ad7100 0000000080200013
00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 14.692531 ] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 14.692877 ]
[ 14.692978 ] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 14.693282 ] ffff888102ad7200: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 14.693737 ] ffff888102ad7280: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 14.694191 ] >ffff888102ad7300: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 14.695061 ] ffff888102ad7380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 14.695518 ] ffff888102ad7400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 fc fc
[ 14.695964 ]
==================================================================]
Reported-by: Zheyu Ma <zheyuma97@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Zheyu Ma <zheyuma97@gmail.com>
---
drivers/firewire/nosy.c | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/firewire/nosy.c b/drivers/firewire/nosy.c
index 5fd6a60b6741..c746aedbaa70 100644
--- a/drivers/firewire/nosy.c
+++ b/drivers/firewire/nosy.c
@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ nosy_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, size_t count, loff_t *offset)
static long
nosy_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
- struct client *client = file->private_data;
+ struct client *tmp, *client = file->private_data;
spinlock_t *client_list_lock = &client->lynx->client_list_lock;
struct nosy_stats stats;
@@ -360,6 +360,10 @@ nosy_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
return 0;
case NOSY_IOC_START:
+ list_for_each_entry(tmp, &client->lynx->client_list, link)
+ if (tmp == client)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
spin_lock_irq(client_list_lock);
list_add_tail(&client->link, &client->lynx->client_list);
spin_unlock_irq(client_list_lock);
--
2.17.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH] firewire: nosy: Fix a use-after-free bug in nosy_ioctl()
2021-04-03 6:58 [PATCH] firewire: nosy: Fix a use-after-free bug in nosy_ioctl() Zheyu Ma
@ 2021-04-03 7:06 ` Greg KH
2021-04-03 16:05 ` Linus Torvalds
1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Greg KH @ 2021-04-03 7:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Zheyu Ma; +Cc: stefanr, linux1394-devel, linux-kernel, security
On Sat, Apr 03, 2021 at 06:58:36AM +0000, Zheyu Ma wrote:
> For each device, the nosy driver allocates a pcilynx structure.
> A use-after-free might happen in the following scenario:
>
> 1. Open nosy device for the first time and call ioctl with command
> NOSY_IOC_START, then a new client A will be malloced and added
> to doubly linked list.
> 2. Open nosy device for the second time and call ioctl with command
> NOSY_IOC_START, then a new client B will be malloced and added
> to doubly linked list.
> 3. Call ioctl with command NOSY_IOC_START for client A, then client A
> will be readded to the doubly linked list. Now the doubly linked
> list is messed up.
> 4. Close the first nosy device and nosy_release will be called.
> In nosy_release, client A will be unlinked and freed.
> 5. Close the second nosy device, and client A will be referenced,
> resulting in UAF.
>
> The root cause of this bug is that the element in the doubly linked list
> is reentered into the list.
> Fix this bug by adding a check before inserting a client. If a client
> is already in the linked list, don't insert it.
>
> The following KASAN report reveals it:
>
> [ 14.672676 ] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in nosy_release+0x1ea/0x210
> [ 14.673113 ] Write of size 8 at addr ffff888102ad7360 by task poc
> [ 14.673609 ] CPU: 3 PID: 337 Comm: poc Not tainted 5.12.0-rc5+ #6
> [ 14.673988 ] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009),
> BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
> [ 14.674686 ] Call Trace:
> [ 14.674843 ] dump_stack+0x8a/0xb5
> [ 14.675061 ] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x18/0x130
> [ 14.675428 ] ? nosy_release+0x1ea/0x210
> [ 14.675676 ] ? nosy_release+0x1ea/0x210
> [ 14.675916 ] kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x111
> [ 14.676169 ] ? nosy_release+0x1ea/0x210
> [ 14.676409 ] nosy_release+0x1ea/0x210
> [ 14.676642 ] __fput+0x1e2/0x840
> [ 14.676844 ] task_work_run+0xe8/0x180
> [ 14.677083 ] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x114/0x120
> [ 14.677388 ] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x40
> [ 14.677678 ] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
> [ 14.677995 ] RIP: 0033:0x7fc5a8666f30
> [ 14.678229 ] Code: 00 64 c7 00 0d 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff eb 90
> b8 ff ff ff ff eb 89 0f 1f 40 00 83 3d d9 27 2c 00 00 75 10 b8 03
> 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e84
> [ 14.679385 ] RSP: 002b:00007ffe9e94cd68 EFLAGS: 00000246
> ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003
> [ 14.679862 ] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000
> RCX: 00007fc5a8666f30
> [ 14.680301 ] RDX: 00007ffe9e94ce78 RSI: 0000000000002601
> RDI: 0000000000000004
> [ 14.680743 ] RBP: 00007ffe9e94cd80 R08: 0000564727400850
> R09: 00007fc5a8939ba0
> [ 14.681180 ] R10: 0000000000000692 R11: 0000000000000246
> R12: 0000564727400610
> [ 14.681624 ] R13: 00007ffe9e94ce60 R14: 0000000000000000
> R15: 0000000000000000
> [ 14.682072 ]
> [ 14.682168 ] Allocated by task 337:
> [ 14.682387 ] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
> [ 14.682633 ] __kasan_kmalloc+0x7a/0x90
> [ 14.682868 ] nosy_open+0x154/0x4d0
> [ 14.683089 ] misc_open+0x2ec/0x410
> [ 14.683313 ] chrdev_open+0x20d/0x5a0
> [ 14.683541 ] do_dentry_open+0x40f/0xe80
> [ 14.683787 ] path_openat+0x1cf9/0x37b0
> [ 14.684025 ] do_filp_open+0x16d/0x390
> [ 14.684253 ] do_sys_openat2+0x11d/0x360
> [ 14.684497 ] __x64_sys_open+0xfd/0x1a0
> [ 14.684736 ] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
> [ 14.684964 ] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
> [ 14.685283 ]
> [ 14.685384 ] Freed by task 337:
> [ 14.685580 ] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
> [ 14.685822 ] kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30
> [ 14.686062 ] kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30
> [ 14.686324 ] __kasan_slab_free+0xe5/0x110
> [ 14.686581 ] kfree+0x8f/0x210
> [ 14.686775 ] nosy_release+0x158/0x210
> [ 14.687011 ] __fput+0x1e2/0x840
> [ 14.687213 ] task_work_run+0xe8/0x180
> [ 14.687449 ] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x114/0x120
> [ 14.687750 ] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x40
> [ 14.688040 ] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
> [ 14.688356 ]
> [ 14.688454 ] The buggy address belongs to the object at
> ffff888102ad7300
> [ 14.688454 ] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128
> [ 14.689232 ] The buggy address is located 96 bytes inside of
> [ 14.689232 ] 128-byte region [ffff888102ad7300, ffff888102ad7380)
> [ 14.689955 ] The buggy address belongs to the page:
> [ 14.690258 ] page:0000000046ca3dc1 refcount:1 mapcount:0
> mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888102ad7100 pfn:0x102ad6
> [ 14.690917 ] head:0000000046ca3dc1 order:1 compound_mapcount:0
> [ 14.691278 ] flags: 0x200000000010200(slab|head)
> [ 14.691562 ] raw: 0200000000010200 dead000000000100
> dead000000000122 ffff8881000428c0
> [ 14.692044 ] raw: ffff888102ad7100 0000000080200013
> 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
> [ 14.692531 ] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
> [ 14.692877 ]
> [ 14.692978 ] Memory state around the buggy address:
> [ 14.693282 ] ffff888102ad7200: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> fb fb fb fb fb fb
> [ 14.693737 ] ffff888102ad7280: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> fc fc fc fc fc fc
> [ 14.694191 ] >ffff888102ad7300: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> fb fb fb fb fb fb
> [ 14.695061 ] ffff888102ad7380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> fc fc fc fc fc fc
> [ 14.695518 ] ffff888102ad7400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
> 00 00 00 00 fc fc
> [ 14.695964 ]
> ==================================================================]
>
> Reported-by: Zheyu Ma <zheyuma97@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Zheyu Ma <zheyuma97@gmail.com>
> ---
> drivers/firewire/nosy.c | 6 +++++-
> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Looks good:
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] firewire: nosy: Fix a use-after-free bug in nosy_ioctl()
2021-04-03 6:58 [PATCH] firewire: nosy: Fix a use-after-free bug in nosy_ioctl() Zheyu Ma
2021-04-03 7:06 ` Greg KH
@ 2021-04-03 16:05 ` Linus Torvalds
1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Linus Torvalds @ 2021-04-03 16:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Zheyu Ma
Cc: stefanr, linux1394-devel, Linux Kernel Mailing List,
Security Officers, Greg Kroah-Hartman
On Fri, Apr 2, 2021 at 11:59 PM Zheyu Ma <zheyuma97@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> case NOSY_IOC_START:
> + list_for_each_entry(tmp, &client->lynx->client_list, link)
> + if (tmp == client)
> + return -EINVAL;
I don't think this is safe.
You are doing this list traversal outside the lock that protects it,
which it taken a line later:
> spin_lock_irq(client_list_lock);
> list_add_tail(&client->link, &client->lynx->client_list);
> spin_unlock_irq(client_list_lock);
so the locking is wrong.
However, I think that the proper fix is not just to move the code
inside the locked region (which makes the error handling a bit more
complex than just a return, of course), but to actually instead of
traversing the list, just look if the "client->link" list is empty.
That's what some other parts of that driver already do (ie
nosy_poll()), so I think that ->link field is already always
initialized properly (and it looks like all the list removal is using
"list_del_init()" to initialize it after removing it from a list.
So I think the patch should be something along the lines of
--- a/drivers/firewire/nosy.c
+++ b/drivers/firewire/nosy.c
@@ -346,6 +346,7 @@ nosy_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int
cmd, unsigned long arg)
struct client *client = file->private_data;
spinlock_t *client_list_lock = &client->lynx->client_list_lock;
struct nosy_stats stats;
+ int ret;
switch (cmd) {
case NOSY_IOC_GET_STATS:
@@ -360,11 +361,15 @@ nosy_ioctl(struct file *file,
return 0;
case NOSY_IOC_START:
+ ret = -EBUSY;
spin_lock_irq(client_list_lock);
- list_add_tail(&client->link, &client->lynx->client_list);
+ if (list_empty(&client->link)) {
+ list_add_tail(&client->link,
&client->lynx->client_list);
+ ret = 0;
+ }
spin_unlock_irq(client_list_lock);
- return 0;
+ return ret;
case NOSY_IOC_STOP:
spin_lock_irq(client_list_lock);
instead. The above is obviously white-space damaged (on purpose - I
don't want to take credit for this patch, I didn't find the problem,
and I have not tested the above in any shape or form).
Zheyu Ma, does something like that work for you?
Comments? Anybody else?
Linus
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2021-04-03 16:06 UTC | newest]
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2021-04-03 6:58 [PATCH] firewire: nosy: Fix a use-after-free bug in nosy_ioctl() Zheyu Ma
2021-04-03 7:06 ` Greg KH
2021-04-03 16:05 ` Linus Torvalds
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