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From: "tip-bot2 for Marco Elver" <tip-bot2@linutronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
	"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: perf/urgent] perf: Refactor permissions check into perf_check_permission()
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 2021 13:58:55 -0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <162739433584.395.14125645089713310487.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210705084453.2151729-2-elver@google.com>

The following commit has been merged into the perf/urgent branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     b068fc04de10fff8974f6ef32b861ad134d94ba4
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/b068fc04de10fff8974f6ef32b861ad134d94ba4
Author:        Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
AuthorDate:    Mon, 05 Jul 2021 10:44:53 +02:00
Committer:     Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
CommitterDate: Fri, 16 Jul 2021 18:46:38 +02:00

perf: Refactor permissions check into perf_check_permission()

Refactor the permission check in perf_event_open() into a helper
perf_check_permission(). This makes the permission check logic more
readable (because we no longer have a negated disjunction). Add a
comment mentioning the ptrace check also checks the uid.

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210705084453.2151729-2-elver@google.com
---
 kernel/events/core.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index c13730b..1cb1f9b 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -11917,6 +11917,37 @@ again:
 	return gctx;
 }
 
+static bool
+perf_check_permission(struct perf_event_attr *attr, struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	unsigned int ptrace_mode = PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS;
+	bool is_capable = perfmon_capable();
+
+	if (attr->sigtrap) {
+		/*
+		 * perf_event_attr::sigtrap sends signals to the other task.
+		 * Require the current task to also have CAP_KILL.
+		 */
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		is_capable &= ns_capable(__task_cred(task)->user_ns, CAP_KILL);
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+
+		/*
+		 * If the required capabilities aren't available, checks for
+		 * ptrace permissions: upgrade to ATTACH, since sending signals
+		 * can effectively change the target task.
+		 */
+		ptrace_mode = PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility. The
+	 * ptrace check also includes checks that the current task and other
+	 * task have matching uids, and is therefore not done here explicitly.
+	 */
+	return is_capable || ptrace_may_access(task, ptrace_mode);
+}
+
 /**
  * sys_perf_event_open - open a performance event, associate it to a task/cpu
  *
@@ -12158,43 +12189,18 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 	}
 
 	if (task) {
-		unsigned int ptrace_mode = PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS;
-		bool is_capable;
-
 		err = down_read_interruptible(&task->signal->exec_update_lock);
 		if (err)
 			goto err_file;
 
-		is_capable = perfmon_capable();
-		if (attr.sigtrap) {
-			/*
-			 * perf_event_attr::sigtrap sends signals to the other
-			 * task. Require the current task to also have
-			 * CAP_KILL.
-			 */
-			rcu_read_lock();
-			is_capable &= ns_capable(__task_cred(task)->user_ns, CAP_KILL);
-			rcu_read_unlock();
-
-			/*
-			 * If the required capabilities aren't available, checks
-			 * for ptrace permissions: upgrade to ATTACH, since
-			 * sending signals can effectively change the target
-			 * task.
-			 */
-			ptrace_mode = PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS;
-		}
-
 		/*
-		 * Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility.
-		 *
 		 * We must hold exec_update_lock across this and any potential
 		 * perf_install_in_context() call for this new event to
 		 * serialize against exec() altering our credentials (and the
 		 * perf_event_exit_task() that could imply).
 		 */
 		err = -EACCES;
-		if (!is_capable && !ptrace_may_access(task, ptrace_mode))
+		if (!perf_check_permission(&attr, task))
 			goto err_cred;
 	}
 

  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-07-27 13:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-07-05  8:44 [PATCH v3 1/2] perf: Fix required permissions if sigtrap is requested Marco Elver
2021-07-05  8:44 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] perf: Refactor permissions check into perf_check_permission() Marco Elver
2021-07-06  6:16   ` Dmitry Vyukov
2021-07-27 13:58   ` tip-bot2 for Marco Elver [this message]
2021-07-06  6:16 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] perf: Fix required permissions if sigtrap is requested Dmitry Vyukov
2021-07-12 10:32 ` Marco Elver
2021-07-13  9:48   ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-07-27 13:58 ` [tip: perf/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Marco Elver

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