From: patchwork-bot+netdevbpf@kernel.org
To: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com,
sstabellini@kernel.org, davem@davemloft.net, kuba@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] xen: harden netfront against malicious backends
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 2021 10:00:13 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <162988561343.31154.5658614827184945239.git-patchwork-notify@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210824102809.26370-1-jgross@suse.com>
Hello:
This series was applied to netdev/net-next.git (refs/heads/master):
On Tue, 24 Aug 2021 12:28:05 +0200 you wrote:
> Xen backends of para-virtualized devices can live in dom0 kernel, dom0
> user land, or in a driver domain. This means that a backend might
> reside in a less trusted environment than the Xen core components, so
> a backend should not be able to do harm to a Xen guest (it can still
> mess up I/O data, but it shouldn't be able to e.g. crash a guest by
> other means or cause a privilege escalation in the guest).
>
> [...]
Here is the summary with links:
- [v2,1/4] xen/netfront: read response from backend only once
https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net-next/c/8446066bf8c1
- [v2,2/4] xen/netfront: don't read data from request on the ring page
https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net-next/c/162081ec33c2
- [v2,3/4] xen/netfront: disentangle tx_skb_freelist
https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net-next/c/21631d2d741a
- [v2,4/4] xen/netfront: don't trust the backend response data blindly
https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net-next/c/a884daa61a7d
You are awesome, thank you!
--
Deet-doot-dot, I am a bot.
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prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-08-25 10:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-08-24 10:28 [PATCH v2 0/4] xen: harden netfront against malicious backends Juergen Gross
2021-08-24 10:28 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] xen/netfront: read response from backend only once Juergen Gross
2021-08-24 10:28 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] xen/netfront: don't read data from request on the ring page Juergen Gross
2021-08-24 15:24 ` Jan Beulich
2021-08-24 10:28 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] xen/netfront: disentangle tx_skb_freelist Juergen Gross
2021-08-24 10:28 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] xen/netfront: don't trust the backend response data blindly Juergen Gross
2021-08-24 15:31 ` Jan Beulich
2021-08-24 15:33 ` [PATCH v2 0/4] xen: harden netfront against malicious backends Jan Beulich
2021-09-10 10:19 ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2021-09-10 11:10 ` Juergen Gross
2021-08-25 10:00 ` patchwork-bot+netdevbpf [this message]
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