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From: "tip-bot2 for Michael Roth" <tip-bot2@linutronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com>,
	watnuss@gmx.de, Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: x86/urgent] x86/boot: Don't propagate uninitialized boot_params->cc_blob_address
Date: Wed, 24 Aug 2022 07:55:47 -0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <166132774791.401.13991431396549405975.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220823160734.89036-1-michael.roth@amd.com>

The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     4b1c742407571eff58b6de9881889f7ca7c4b4dc
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/4b1c742407571eff58b6de9881889f7ca7c4b4dc
Author:        Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
AuthorDate:    Tue, 23 Aug 2022 11:07:34 -05:00
Committer:     Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
CommitterDate: Wed, 24 Aug 2022 09:03:04 +02:00

x86/boot: Don't propagate uninitialized boot_params->cc_blob_address

In some cases, bootloaders will leave boot_params->cc_blob_address
uninitialized rather than zeroing it out. This field is only meant to be
set by the boot/compressed kernel in order to pass information to the
uncompressed kernel when SEV-SNP support is enabled.

Therefore, there are no cases where the bootloader-provided values
should be treated as anything other than garbage. Otherwise, the
uncompressed kernel may attempt to access this bogus address, leading to
a crash during early boot.

Normally, sanitize_boot_params() would be used to clear out such fields
but that happens too late: sev_enable() may have already initialized
it to a valid value that should not be zeroed out. Instead, have
sev_enable() zero it out unconditionally beforehand.

Also ensure this happens for !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT as well by also
including this handling in the sev_enable() stub function.

  [ bp: Massage commit message and comments. ]

Fixes: b190a043c49a ("x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup")
Reported-by: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com>
Reported-by: watnuss@gmx.de
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216387
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220823160734.89036-1-michael.roth@amd.com
---
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h | 12 +++++++++++-
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c  |  8 ++++++++
 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
index 4910bf2..62208ec 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
@@ -132,7 +132,17 @@ void snp_set_page_private(unsigned long paddr);
 void snp_set_page_shared(unsigned long paddr);
 void sev_prep_identity_maps(unsigned long top_level_pgt);
 #else
-static inline void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { }
+static inline void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
+{
+	/*
+	 * bp->cc_blob_address should only be set by boot/compressed kernel.
+	 * Initialize it to 0 unconditionally (thus here in this stub too) to
+	 * ensure that uninitialized values from buggy bootloaders aren't
+	 * propagated.
+	 */
+	if (bp)
+		bp->cc_blob_address = 0;
+}
 static inline void sev_es_shutdown_ghcb(void) { }
 static inline bool sev_es_check_ghcb_fault(unsigned long address)
 {
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
index 52f989f..c93930d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
@@ -277,6 +277,14 @@ void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
 	bool snp;
 
 	/*
+	 * bp->cc_blob_address should only be set by boot/compressed kernel.
+	 * Initialize it to 0 to ensure that uninitialized values from
+	 * buggy bootloaders aren't propagated.
+	 */
+	if (bp)
+		bp->cc_blob_address = 0;
+
+	/*
 	 * Setup/preliminary detection of SNP. This will be sanity-checked
 	 * against CPUID/MSR values later.
 	 */

      parent reply	other threads:[~2022-08-24  7:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-08-23 16:07 [PATCH] x86/boot: Don't propagate uninitialized boot_params->cc_blob_address Michael Roth
2022-08-23 17:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-08-24  7:55 ` tip-bot2 for Michael Roth [this message]

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