From: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
To: hpa@zytor.com, kys@microsoft.com, haiyangz@microsoft.com,
wei.liu@kernel.org, decui@microsoft.com, luto@kernel.org,
peterz@infradead.org, davem@davemloft.net, edumazet@google.com,
kuba@kernel.org, pabeni@redhat.com, lpieralisi@kernel.org,
robh@kernel.org, kw@linux.com, bhelgaas@google.com,
arnd@arndb.de, hch@infradead.org, m.szyprowski@samsung.com,
robin.murphy@arm.com, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
brijesh.singh@amd.com, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com,
bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com, kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com,
sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, ak@linux.intel.com,
isaku.yamahata@intel.com, dan.j.williams@intel.com,
jane.chu@oracle.com, seanjc@google.com, tony.luck@intel.com,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
iommu@lists.linux.dev
Cc: mikelley@microsoft.com
Subject: [Patch v3 09/14] Drivers: hv: vmbus: Remove second mapping of VMBus monitor pages
Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2022 10:41:32 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1668624097-14884-10-git-send-email-mikelley@microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1668624097-14884-1-git-send-email-mikelley@microsoft.com>
With changes to how Hyper-V guest VMs flip memory between private
(encrypted) and shared (decrypted), creating a second kernel virtual
mapping for shared memory is no longer necessary. Everything needed
for the transition to shared is handled by set_memory_decrypted().
As such, remove the code to create and manage the second
mapping for VMBus monitor pages. Because set_memory_decrypted()
and set_memory_encrypted() are no-ops in normal VMs, it's
not even necessary to test for being in a Confidential VM
(a.k.a., "Isolation VM").
Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tianyu Lan <Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com>
---
drivers/hv/connection.c | 113 ++++++++++++----------------------------------
drivers/hv/hyperv_vmbus.h | 2 -
2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 87 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/hv/connection.c b/drivers/hv/connection.c
index 9dc27e5..e473b69 100644
--- a/drivers/hv/connection.c
+++ b/drivers/hv/connection.c
@@ -104,8 +104,14 @@ int vmbus_negotiate_version(struct vmbus_channel_msginfo *msginfo, u32 version)
vmbus_connection.msg_conn_id = VMBUS_MESSAGE_CONNECTION_ID;
}
- msg->monitor_page1 = vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_pa[0];
- msg->monitor_page2 = vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_pa[1];
+ /*
+ * shared_gpa_boundary is zero in non-SNP VMs, so it's safe to always
+ * do the add
+ */
+ msg->monitor_page1 = virt_to_phys(vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0]) +
+ ms_hyperv.shared_gpa_boundary;
+ msg->monitor_page2 = virt_to_phys(vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1]) +
+ ms_hyperv.shared_gpa_boundary;
msg->target_vcpu = hv_cpu_number_to_vp_number(VMBUS_CONNECT_CPU);
@@ -219,72 +225,27 @@ int vmbus_connect(void)
* Setup the monitor notification facility. The 1st page for
* parent->child and the 2nd page for child->parent
*/
- vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0] = (void *)hv_alloc_hyperv_zeroed_page();
- vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1] = (void *)hv_alloc_hyperv_zeroed_page();
+ vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0] = (void *)hv_alloc_hyperv_page();
+ vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1] = (void *)hv_alloc_hyperv_page();
if ((vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0] == NULL) ||
(vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1] == NULL)) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
- vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_original[0]
- = vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0];
- vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_original[1]
- = vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1];
- vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_pa[0]
- = virt_to_phys(vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0]);
- vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_pa[1]
- = virt_to_phys(vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1]);
-
- if (hv_is_isolation_supported()) {
- ret = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)
- vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0],
- 1);
- ret |= set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)
- vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1],
- 1);
- if (ret)
- goto cleanup;
-
- /*
- * Isolation VM with AMD SNP needs to access monitor page via
- * address space above shared gpa boundary.
- */
- if (hv_isolation_type_snp()) {
- vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_pa[0] +=
- ms_hyperv.shared_gpa_boundary;
- vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_pa[1] +=
- ms_hyperv.shared_gpa_boundary;
-
- vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0]
- = memremap(vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_pa[0],
- HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE,
- MEMREMAP_WB);
- if (!vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0]) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1]
- = memremap(vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_pa[1],
- HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE,
- MEMREMAP_WB);
- if (!vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1]) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto cleanup;
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * Set memory host visibility hvcall smears memory
- * and so zero monitor pages here.
- */
- memset(vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0], 0x00,
- HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE);
- memset(vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1], 0x00,
- HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE);
+ ret = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)
+ vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0], 1);
+ ret |= set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)
+ vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1], 1);
+ if (ret)
+ goto cleanup;
- }
+ /*
+ * Set_memory_decrypted() will change the memory contents if
+ * decryption occurs, so zero monitor pages here.
+ */
+ memset(vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0], 0x00, HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE);
+ memset(vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1], 0x00, HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE);
msginfo = kzalloc(sizeof(*msginfo) +
sizeof(struct vmbus_channel_initiate_contact),
@@ -376,31 +337,13 @@ void vmbus_disconnect(void)
vmbus_connection.int_page = NULL;
}
- if (hv_is_isolation_supported()) {
- /*
- * memunmap() checks input address is ioremap address or not
- * inside. It doesn't unmap any thing in the non-SNP CVM and
- * so not check CVM type here.
- */
- memunmap(vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0]);
- memunmap(vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1]);
-
- set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)
- vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_original[0],
- 1);
- set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)
- vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_original[1],
- 1);
- }
+ set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0], 1);
+ set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1], 1);
- hv_free_hyperv_page((unsigned long)
- vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_original[0]);
- hv_free_hyperv_page((unsigned long)
- vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_original[1]);
- vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_original[0] =
- vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0] = NULL;
- vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_original[1] =
- vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1] = NULL;
+ hv_free_hyperv_page((unsigned long)vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0]);
+ hv_free_hyperv_page((unsigned long)vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1]);
+ vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0] = NULL;
+ vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1] = NULL;
}
/*
diff --git a/drivers/hv/hyperv_vmbus.h b/drivers/hv/hyperv_vmbus.h
index dc673ed..167ac51 100644
--- a/drivers/hv/hyperv_vmbus.h
+++ b/drivers/hv/hyperv_vmbus.h
@@ -241,8 +241,6 @@ struct vmbus_connection {
* is child->parent notification
*/
struct hv_monitor_page *monitor_pages[2];
- void *monitor_pages_original[2];
- phys_addr_t monitor_pages_pa[2];
struct list_head chn_msg_list;
spinlock_t channelmsg_lock;
--
1.8.3.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-11-16 18:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 67+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-11-16 18:41 [Patch v3 00/14] Add PCI pass-thru support to Hyper-V Confidential VMs Michael Kelley
2022-11-16 18:41 ` [Patch v3 01/14] x86/ioremap: Fix page aligned size calculation in __ioremap_caller() Michael Kelley
2022-11-21 13:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-11-21 16:40 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-11-21 19:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-11-21 21:02 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-11-21 18:14 ` Dave Hansen
2022-11-21 21:04 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-11-21 21:08 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-11-22 11:38 ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Michael Kelley
2022-11-16 18:41 ` [Patch v3 02/14] x86/ioapic: Gate decrypted mapping on cc_platform_has() attribute Michael Kelley
2022-11-17 21:39 ` Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
2022-11-21 13:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-11-21 16:43 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-11-21 19:47 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-11-16 18:41 ` [Patch v3 03/14] x86/hyperv: Reorder code in prep for subsequent patch Michael Kelley
2022-11-16 18:41 ` [Patch v3 04/14] Drivers: hv: Explicitly request decrypted in vmap_pfn() calls Michael Kelley
2022-11-16 18:41 ` [Patch v3 05/14] x86/mm: Handle decryption/re-encryption of bss_decrypted consistently Michael Kelley
2022-11-16 20:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2022-11-16 21:15 ` Tom Lendacky
2022-11-18 2:59 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-11-17 21:47 ` Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
2022-11-18 2:55 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-11-21 14:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-11-21 22:06 ` Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
2022-11-22 17:59 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-11-28 10:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-11-28 2:52 ` Dexuan Cui
2022-11-28 14:15 ` Tom Lendacky
2022-11-28 18:06 ` Dexuan Cui
2022-11-21 14:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-11-16 18:41 ` [Patch v3 06/14] init: Call mem_encrypt_init() after Hyper-V hypercall init is done Michael Kelley
2022-11-16 21:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2022-11-21 14:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-11-16 18:41 ` [Patch v3 07/14] x86/hyperv: Change vTOM handling to use standard coco mechanisms Michael Kelley
2022-11-17 2:59 ` Tianyu Lan
2022-11-21 15:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-11-22 18:22 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-11-22 18:30 ` Dave Hansen
2022-11-22 22:02 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-11-22 22:18 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-11-23 0:59 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-11-28 14:38 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-11-28 16:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-11-28 16:59 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-11-28 17:24 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-11-28 17:55 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-11-28 19:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-11-29 1:15 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-11-29 8:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-11-29 15:49 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-11-29 17:47 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-11-30 16:11 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-11-16 18:41 ` [Patch v3 08/14] swiotlb: Remove bounce buffer remapping for Hyper-V Michael Kelley
2022-11-16 18:41 ` Michael Kelley [this message]
2022-11-16 18:41 ` [Patch v3 10/14] Drivers: hv: vmbus: Remove second way of mapping ring buffers Michael Kelley
2022-11-16 18:41 ` [Patch v3 11/14] hv_netvsc: Remove second mapping of send and recv buffers Michael Kelley
2022-11-16 18:41 ` [Patch v3 12/14] Drivers: hv: Don't remap addresses that are above shared_gpa_boundary Michael Kelley
2022-11-16 18:41 ` [Patch v3 13/14] PCI: hv: Add hypercalls to read/write MMIO space Michael Kelley
2022-11-17 15:16 ` Wei Liu
2022-11-17 16:14 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-11-17 17:01 ` Wei Liu
2022-11-17 16:32 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-11-17 17:00 ` Wei Liu
2022-11-17 18:33 ` Haiyang Zhang
2022-11-18 2:38 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-11-16 18:41 ` [Patch v3 14/14] PCI: hv: Enable PCI pass-thru devices in Confidential VMs Michael Kelley
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=1668624097-14884-10-git-send-email-mikelley@microsoft.com \
--to=mikelley@microsoft.com \
--cc=Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com \
--cc=ak@linux.intel.com \
--cc=arnd@arndb.de \
--cc=bhelgaas@google.com \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=brijesh.singh@amd.com \
--cc=dan.j.williams@intel.com \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=davem@davemloft.net \
--cc=decui@microsoft.com \
--cc=edumazet@google.com \
--cc=haiyangz@microsoft.com \
--cc=hch@infradead.org \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=iommu@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=isaku.yamahata@intel.com \
--cc=jane.chu@oracle.com \
--cc=kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com \
--cc=kuba@kernel.org \
--cc=kw@linux.com \
--cc=kys@microsoft.com \
--cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-pci@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=lpieralisi@kernel.org \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=m.szyprowski@samsung.com \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=pabeni@redhat.com \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=robh@kernel.org \
--cc=robin.murphy@arm.com \
--cc=sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com \
--cc=seanjc@google.com \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
--cc=tony.luck@intel.com \
--cc=wei.liu@kernel.org \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).