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From: "tip-bot2 for Kirill A. Shutemov" <tip-bot2@linutronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@alien8.de>,
	Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com>,
	Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
	<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: x86/sev] x86/mm: Fix memory encryption features advertisement
Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 16:26:14 -0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <170663197449.398.3923766970691246483.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240124140217.533748-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>

The following commit has been merged into the x86/sev branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     4cab62c058f5a150d9960c112362e5c76d204d9d
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/4cab62c058f5a150d9960c112362e5c76d204d9d
Author:        Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
AuthorDate:    Wed, 24 Jan 2024 16:02:16 +02:00
Committer:     Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
CommitterDate: Mon, 29 Jan 2024 17:08:27 +01:00

x86/mm: Fix memory encryption features advertisement

When memory encryption is enabled, the kernel prints the encryption
flavor that the system supports.

The check assumes that everything is AMD SME/SEV if it doesn't have
the TDX CPU feature set.

Hyper-V vTOM sets cc_vendor to CC_VENDOR_INTEL when it runs as L2 guest
on top of TDX, but not X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST. Hyper-V only needs memory
encryption enabled for I/O without the rest of CoCo enabling.

To avoid confusion, check the cc_vendor directly.

  [ bp: Massage commit message. ]

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240124140217.533748-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
---
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index c290c55..d035bce 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -42,38 +42,42 @@ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
 
 static void print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(void)
 {
-	pr_info("Memory Encryption Features active:");
+	pr_info("Memory Encryption Features active: ");
 
-	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST)) {
-		pr_cont(" Intel TDX\n");
-		return;
-	}
-
-	pr_cont(" AMD");
+	switch (cc_vendor) {
+	case CC_VENDOR_INTEL:
+		pr_cont("Intel TDX\n");
+		break;
+	case CC_VENDOR_AMD:
+		pr_cont("AMD");
 
-	/* Secure Memory Encryption */
-	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
+		/* Secure Memory Encryption */
+		if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
 		/*
 		 * SME is mutually exclusive with any of the SEV
 		 * features below.
-		 */
-		pr_cont(" SME\n");
-		return;
+		*/
+			pr_cont(" SME\n");
+			return;
+		}
+
+		/* Secure Encrypted Virtualization */
+		if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
+			pr_cont(" SEV");
+
+		/* Encrypted Register State */
+		if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT))
+			pr_cont(" SEV-ES");
+
+		/* Secure Nested Paging */
+		if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP))
+			pr_cont(" SEV-SNP");
+
+		pr_cont("\n");
+		break;
+	default:
+		pr_cont("Unknown\n");
 	}
-
-	/* Secure Encrypted Virtualization */
-	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
-		pr_cont(" SEV");
-
-	/* Encrypted Register State */
-	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT))
-		pr_cont(" SEV-ES");
-
-	/* Secure Nested Paging */
-	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP))
-		pr_cont(" SEV-SNP");
-
-	pr_cont("\n");
 }
 
 /* Architecture __weak replacement functions */

      parent reply	other threads:[~2024-01-30 16:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-01-24 14:02 [PATCHv2, RESEND] x86/mm: Fix memory encryption features advertisement Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-24 21:37 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-30 16:26 ` tip-bot2 for Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]

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