Re: [PATCH] API for true Random Number Generators to add entropy (2.6.11)

From: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
To: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Evgeniy Polyakov <johnpol@2ka.mipt.ru>,
	Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@pobox.com>,
	David McCullough <davidm@snapgear.com>,
	cryptoapi@lists.logix.cz, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>,
	James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] API for true Random Number Generators to add entropy (2.6.11)
Date: Tue, 29 Mar 2005 12:21:04 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20050329102104.GB6496@elf.ucw.cz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20050325061311.GA22959@gondor.apana.org.au>

On Pá 25-03-05 17:13:11, Herbert Xu wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 25, 2005 at 09:16:01AM +0300, Evgeniy Polyakov wrote:
> > On Fri, 2005-03-25 at 00:58 -0500, Jeff Garzik wrote:
> >
> > > If its disabled by default, then you and 2-3 other people will use this 
> > > feature.  Not enough justification for a kernel API at that point.
> > 
> > It is only because there are only couple of HW crypto devices
> > in the tree, with one crypto framework inclusion there will be
> > at least redouble.
> 
> You missed the point.  This has nothing to do with the crypto API.
> Jeff is saying that if this is disabled by default, then only a few
> users will enable it and therefore use this API.
> 
> Since we can't afford to enable it by default as hardware RNG may
> fail which can lead to catastrophic consequences, there is no point
> for this API at all.

What catastrophic consequences? Noone is likely to even *notice*, and
it does not help practical attack at all. Unless hardware RNGs are
*very* flakey (like, more flakey than harddrives), this is not a problem.

I can assure you that failing hdd will have more catastrophic
consequences.
								Pavel
-- 
People were complaining that M$ turns users into beta-testers...
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