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Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2006 18:31:52 -0500
To: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>, Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru>,
       linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: FMODE_EXEC or alike?
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References: <20060220221948.GC5733@linuxhacker.ru> <20060220215122.7aa8bbe5.akpm@osdl.org> <1140530396.7864.63.camel@lade.trondhjem.org> <20060221232607.GS22042@fieldses.org> <1140564751.8088.35.camel@lade.trondhjem.org> <20060222195721.GC28219@fieldses.org> <1140644216.7879.7.camel@lade.trondhjem.org> <20060222220435.GJ28219@fieldses.org> <1140646653.7879.25.camel@lade.trondhjem.org>
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From: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
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On Wed, Feb 22, 2006 at 05:17:33PM -0500, Trond Myklebust wrote:
> I understand FMODE_EXEC to mean that we want to call
> deny_write_access(). OTOH, FMODE_WRITE is supposed to trigger an
> automatic call to get_write_access().

Ugh.  OK, well that makes FMODE_EXEC useless for the server, then.

It'd be nice to be able to give the server some way of enforcing the
deny bits.  Otherwise, though translating FMODE_EXEC to DENY_WRITE will
at least allow the nfs server to deny writes by other clients, it'll
still do nothing to protect against writers on the exported filesystem
(even local writers--nevermind the cluster case).

And an open flag is attractive since it gives at least some hope that we
might be able to do DENY_WRITE atomically with the open.  Samba
apparently just does the open and then tries to get a mandatory lock
afterwards, but that seems racy.

--b.