From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751100AbWDTQsS (ORCPT ); Thu, 20 Apr 2006 12:48:18 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1751104AbWDTQsS (ORCPT ); Thu, 20 Apr 2006 12:48:18 -0400 Received: from mx1.suse.de ([195.135.220.2]:58563 "EHLO mx1.suse.de") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751098AbWDTQsE (ORCPT ); Thu, 20 Apr 2006 12:48:04 -0400 Date: Thu, 20 Apr 2006 09:46:51 -0700 From: Greg KH To: Stephen Smalley Cc: Christoph Hellwig , tonyj@suse.de, James Morris , Jan Engelhardt , Andrew Morton , T?r?k Edwin , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Chris Wright , Linus Torvalds Subject: Re: Removing EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ops) (was Re: Time to remove LSM) Message-ID: <20060420164651.GA2439@kroah.com> References: <20060419154011.GA26635@kroah.com> <20060419181015.GC11091@kroah.com> <1145536791.16456.37.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> <20060420150037.GA30353@kroah.com> <1145542811.3313.94.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> <20060420161552.GA1990@kroah.com> <20060420162309.GA18726@infradead.org> <1145550897.3313.143.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1145550897.3313.143.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.11 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Thu, Apr 20, 2006 at 12:34:57PM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote: > On Thu, 2006-04-20 at 17:23 +0100, Christoph Hellwig wrote: > > On Thu, Apr 20, 2006 at 09:15:52AM -0700, Greg KH wrote: > > > On Thu, Apr 20, 2006 at 10:20:11AM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote: > > > > On Thu, 2006-04-20 at 08:00 -0700, Greg KH wrote: > > > > > I agree. In looking over the code some more, I'm trying to figure out > > > > > why we are exporting that variable at all. Is it because of people > > > > > wanting to stack security modules? > > > > > > > > > > I see selinux code using it, but you are always built into the kernel, > > > > > right? So unexporting it would not be an issue to you. > > > > > > > > Various in-tree modules (e.g. ext3) call security hooks via the static > > > > inlines and end up referencing security_ops directly. We'd have to wrap > > > > all such hooks in the same manner as capable and permission. > > > > > > Ah, and people like making their file systems as modules :( > > > > But actually yes, calling into rndom lsm hooks in modules is not a good > > thing.a The only think filesystems calls is security_inode_init_security > > and it would make a lot of sense to make that an out of line wrapper > > instead of exporting security_ops. > > There are other cases as well, I think, e.g. af_unix calls certain hooks > to ensure mediation of even the abstract namespace. But the problem is > avoided altogether if the security static inlines compile down to direct > selinux function calls (which can be exported as needed). Of course it's "avoided alltogether" but we are not talking about dropping the whole LSM interface here right now. I am wanting something that can go into 2.6.17 to fix this issue this week. thanks, greg k-h