Re: [ckrm-tech] [PATCH 7/7] containers (V7): Container interface to nsproxy subsystem

[Srivatsa Vaddagiri <vatsa@in.ibm.com>]

On Sat, Mar 24, 2007 at 10:35:37AM +0530, Srivatsa Vaddagiri wrote:
> > +static int ns_create(struct container_subsys *ss, struct container *cont)
> > +{
> > +	struct nscont *ns;
> > +
> > +	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> > +		return -EPERM;
> 
> Does this check break existing namespace semantics in a subtle way?
> It now requires that unshare() of namespaces by any task requires
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN capabilities.

I should clarify that I am referring to unshare thr' clone here (and not
thr' sys_unshare)

> clone(.., CLONE_NEWUTS, ..)->copy_namespaces()->ns_container_clone()->
> 	->container_clone()-> .. -> container_create() -> ns_create()
> 
> Earlier, one could unshare his uts namespace w/o CAP_SYS_ADMIN
> capabilities. Now it is required. Is that fine? Don't know.
> 
> I feel we can avoid this check totally and let the directory permissions
> take care of these checks.
> 
> Serge, what do you think?

-- 
Regards,
vatsa