From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S933013AbXFFRdT (ORCPT ); Wed, 6 Jun 2007 13:33:19 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1756440AbXFFRdA (ORCPT ); Wed, 6 Jun 2007 13:33:00 -0400 Received: from pentafluge.infradead.org ([213.146.154.40]:37345 "EHLO pentafluge.infradead.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754678AbXFFRc7 (ORCPT ); Wed, 6 Jun 2007 13:32:59 -0400 Date: Wed, 6 Jun 2007 10:32:31 -0700 From: Greg KH To: Stephen Smalley Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher , Pavel Machek , jjohansen@suse.de, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching Message-ID: <20070606173231.GC1477@kroah.com> References: <20070514110607.549397248@suse.de> <20070514110621.655650997@suse.de> <20070515092010.GE6816@ucw.cz> <200706042303.28785.agruen@suse.de> <1181136386.3699.70.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1181136386.3699.70.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.15 (2007-04-06) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Jun 06, 2007 at 09:26:26AM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote: > On Mon, 2007-06-04 at 23:03 +0200, Andreas Gruenbacher wrote: > > On Tuesday 15 May 2007 11:20, Pavel Machek wrote: > > > Hi! > > > > > > > Pathname matching, transition table loading, profile loading and > > > > manipulation. > > > > > > So we get small interpretter of state machines, and reason we need is > > > is 'apparmor is misdesigned and works with paths when it should have > > > worked with handles'. > > > > I assume you mean labels instead of handles. > > > > AppArmor's design is around paths not labels, and independent of whether or > > not you like AppArmor, this design leads to a useful security model distinct > > from the SELinux security model (which is useful in its own ways). The > > differences between those models cannot be argued away, neither is a subset > > of the other, and neither is a misdesign. I would be thankful if you could > > stop spreading this lie. > > I have a hard time distinguishing AppArmor's "model" from its > implementation; every time we suggest that one might emulate much of > AppArmor's functionality on SELinux (as in SEEdit), someone points to a > specific characteristic of the AppArmor implementation that cannot be > emulated in this manner. But is that implementation characteristic an > actual requirement or just how it happens to have been done to date in > AA? And I get the impression that even if we extended SELinux in > certain ways to ease such emulation, the AA folks would never be > satisfied because the implementation would still differ. Can we > separate the desired functionality and actual requirements from the > implementation specifics? That's a really good point, is there a description of the AA "model" anywhere that we could see to determine if there really is a way to possibly use the current SELinux internals to show this model to the user? thanks, greg k-h