From: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
To: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
jmorris@namei.org, eugeneteo@kernel.org, kees.cook@canonical.com,
mingo@elte.hu, davem@davemloft.net
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] kptr_restrict for hiding kernel pointers from unprivileged users
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2010 16:53:19 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20101217165319.98670d66.akpm@linux-foundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1292025924.2965.20.camel@Dan>
On Fri, 10 Dec 2010 19:05:24 -0500
Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> wrote:
> + case 'K':
> + if (kptr_restrict) {
> + if (in_irq() || in_serving_softirq() || in_nmi())
> + WARN(1, "%%pK used in interrupt context.\n");
> +
> + else if (capable(CAP_SYSLOG))
> + break;
> +
> + if (spec.field_width == -1) {
> + spec.field_width = 2 * sizeof(void *);
> + spec.flags |= ZEROPAD;
> + }
> + return number(buf, end, 0, spec);
> + }
> + break;
Also, we should emit the runtime warning even if kptr_restrict is
false. Otherwise programmers might ship buggy code because they didn't
enable kptr_restrict during testing.
So what I ended up with was
case 'K':
/*
* %pK cannot be used in IRQ context because it tests
* CAP_SYSLOG.
*/
if (in_irq() || in_serving_softirq() || in_nmi())
WARN_ONCE(1, "%%pK used in interrupt context.\n");
if (!kptr_restrict)
break; /* %pK does not obscure pointers */
if (capable(CAP_SYSLOG))
break; /* privileged apps expose pointers */
if (spec.field_width == -1) {
spec.field_width = 2 * sizeof(void *);
spec.flags |= ZEROPAD;
}
return number(buf, end, 0, spec);
How does that look?
Also... permitting root to bypass the %pK obscuring seems pretty lame,
really. I bet a *lot* of the existing %p sites are already root-only
(eg, driver initialisation). So much of the value is lost.
prev parent reply other threads:[~2010-12-18 0:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2010-12-11 0:05 [PATCH v2] kptr_restrict for hiding kernel pointers from unprivileged users Dan Rosenberg
2010-12-11 0:11 ` Kees Cook
2010-12-18 0:44 ` Andrew Morton
2010-12-18 1:12 ` Dan Rosenberg
2010-12-18 1:22 ` Andrew Morton
2010-12-18 5:22 ` Dan Rosenberg
2010-12-18 0:53 ` Andrew Morton [this message]
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