From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1757345Ab2IDQNA (ORCPT ); Tue, 4 Sep 2012 12:13:00 -0400 Received: from cavan.codon.org.uk ([93.93.128.6]:41539 "EHLO cavan.codon.org.uk" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1750777Ab2IDQM6 (ORCPT ); Tue, 4 Sep 2012 12:12:58 -0400 Date: Tue, 4 Sep 2012 17:12:56 +0100 From: Matthew Garrett To: Alan Cox Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [RFC] First attempt at kernel secure boot support Message-ID: <20120904161256.GA22961@srcf.ucam.org> References: <1346774117-2277-1-git-send-email-mjg@redhat.com> <20120904170853.0fa6b27b@pyramind.ukuu.org.uk> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20120904170853.0fa6b27b@pyramind.ukuu.org.uk> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.20 (2009-06-14) X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: mjg59@cavan.codon.org.uk X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on cavan.codon.org.uk); SAEximRunCond expanded to false Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Sep 04, 2012 at 05:08:53PM +0100, Alan Cox wrote: > On Tue, 4 Sep 2012 11:55:06 -0400 > Matthew Garrett wrote: > > > The UEFI Secure Boot trust model is based on it not being possible for a > > user to cause a signed OS to boot an unsigned OS > > Unfortunately you can't fix this at kernel level because an untrusted > application can at GUI level fake a system crash, reboot cycle and phish > any basic credentials such as passwords for the windows partition. Any well-designed software asking for credentials should already be requiring a SAK, so in that case we just need to implement sensible SAK support in Linux. -- Matthew Garrett | mjg59@srcf.ucam.org