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Date: Tue, 4 Sep 2012 17:38:29 +0100
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
To: Shuah Khan <shuahkhan@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 10/11] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter in a
 secure boot environment
Message-ID: <20120904163829.GA23777@srcf.ucam.org>
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On Tue, Sep 04, 2012 at 10:30:46AM -0600, Shuah Khan wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 4, 2012 at 9:55 AM, Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> wrote:
> > From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
> >
> > This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel.  This
> > could potentially be used to circumvent the secure boot trust model.
> > We ignore the setting if we don't have the CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE capability.
> 
> Does this mean, acpi_rsdp is disabled on all current platforms that
> don't support CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE?

No, if you're not using secure boot then you'll have 
CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE.

-- 
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@srcf.ucam.org