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Date: Tue, 4 Sep 2012 21:37:32 +0100
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
To: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuahkhan@gmail.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
        Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 10/11] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter in a
 secure boot environment
Message-ID: <20120904203732.GA29508@srcf.ucam.org>
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On Tue, Sep 04, 2012 at 09:37:42PM +0100, Alan Cox wrote:
> > Gotta say this capability name is confusing. Naming is
> > CAP_PRE_SECURE_BOOT or something along the lines might be a better
> > choice. When I just look at this name, I sure thought this
> > CAP_SECURE_FIRMWARE true means it is a secure boot capable firmware.
> 
> Given there is nothing secure about it would it also be better to call it
> AUTHENTICATED_BOOT ?

Well, there is the question of whether the sense is correct - you'll 
only have this capability if you don't boot with any form of 
authentication. CAP_KERNEL_ACCESS?

-- 
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@srcf.ucam.org