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From: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 07/11] kexec: Disable in a secure boot environment
Date: Tue, 4 Sep 2012 22:39:57 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20120904223957.50f6a3b9@pyramind.ukuu.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87r4qhwkx9.fsf@xmission.com>

> > Well, given that approximately everyone will be booting under EFI within 
> > 18 months, treating it as a niche case seems a little short sighted.

Actually the majority of Linux devices are not PCs 8)

> > secondly, there are already several non-EFI platforms that want to enact 
> > a policy preventing root from being able to arbitrarily replace the 
> > kernel. Given that people are doing this in the wild, it makes sense to 
> > move towards offering that policy in the mainline kernel.
> 
> Either this code makes sense without an appeal to EFI or this code makes
> no sense.

Yes - and the capability is I think the right starting point (although
you'll never make any OS locked down this way even if you are not in fact
violating the GPLv2 license by doing so, which I suspect will be the case
for some implementations)

> So please rework this to come from an angle that makes sense all by
> itself.

I think it needs to be defined in terms of what the capability is
supposed to guarantee. I have a feeling Matthew has a pretty clear idea
about that in his head so can nail it fairly precisely ?

Alan

  parent reply	other threads:[~2012-09-04 21:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-09-04 15:55 [RFC] First attempt at kernel secure boot support Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 01/11] Secure boot: Add new capability Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 02/11] PCI: Lock down BAR access in secure boot environments Matthew Garrett
2012-10-01 21:00   ` Pavel Machek
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 03/11] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 16:16   ` Alan Cox
2012-09-04 16:16     ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 04/11] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 05/11] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 16:12   ` Alan Cox
2012-09-04 16:13     ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 06/11] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem in secure boot setups Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 07/11] kexec: Disable in a secure boot environment Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 20:13   ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-09-04 20:22     ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 21:13       ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-09-04 21:27         ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 22:12           ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-09-04 23:25             ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-05  4:33               ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-09-05  5:16                 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-05  7:00                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-09-05  7:03                     ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 21:39         ` Alan Cox [this message]
2012-09-04 21:40           ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-05 15:43             ` Roland Eggner
2012-09-05 15:46               ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-05 21:13   ` Mimi Zohar
2012-09-05 21:41     ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-05 21:49       ` Eric Paris
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 08/11] Secure boot: Add a dummy kernel parameter that will switch on Secure Boot mode Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 09/11] efi: Enable secure boot lockdown automatically when enabled in firmware Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 10/11] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter in a secure boot environment Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 16:30   ` Shuah Khan
2012-09-04 16:38     ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 16:44       ` Shuah Khan
2012-09-04 20:37         ` Alan Cox
2012-09-04 20:37           ` Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 20:50             ` Josh Boyer
2012-09-04 15:55 ` [PATCH 11/11] SELinux: define mapping for new Secure Boot capability Matthew Garrett
2012-09-04 16:08 ` [RFC] First attempt at kernel secure boot support Alan Cox
2012-09-04 16:12   ` Matthew Garrett
2012-10-01 21:07     ` Pavel Machek

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