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Date: Wed, 5 Sep 2012 16:46:51 +0100
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
To: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH 07/11] kexec: Disable in a secure boot environment
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On Wed, Sep 05, 2012 at 05:43:08PM +0200, Roland Eggner wrote:

> Jonathan Brossard:  “… We have built a generic proof of concept malware for the 
> Intel architecture,  called 'Rakshasa',  capable of infecting more than 100 
> different motherboards.  Targets are BIOS and firmware of PCI-devices.  …”
> http://www.toucan-system.com/research/blackhat2012_brossard_hardware_backdooring.pdf

Neatly avoided by the relevant UEFI platforms requiring that all 
firmware be signed.

-- 
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@srcf.ucam.org