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From: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
To: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>,
	alex.williamson@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86, x2apic: Only WARN on broken BIOSes inside a virtual guest
Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2013 22:00:24 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20130131200024.GB1757@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20130131193427.GP98867@redhat.com>

On Thu, Jan 31, 2013 at 02:34:27PM -0500, Don Zickus wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 31, 2013 at 08:52:00PM +0200, Gleb Natapov wrote:
> > > http://www.invisiblethingslab.com/resources/2011/Software%20Attacks%20on%20Intel%20VT-d.pdf
> > > 
> > > After talking with folks, the threat of irq injections on virtual guests
> > > made sense.  However, when discussing if this was possible on bare metal
> > > machines, we could not come up with a plausible scenario.
> > > 
> > The irq injections is something that a guest with assigned device does
> > to attack a hypervisor it runs on. Interrupt remapping protects host
> > from this attack. According to pdf above if x2apic is disabled in a
> > hypervisor interrupt remapping can be bypassed and leave host vulnerable
> > to guest attack. This means that situation is exactly opposite: warning
> > has sense on a bare metal, but not in a guest. I am not sure that there is
> > a hypervisor that emulates interrupt remapping device though and without
> > it the warning cannot be triggered in a guest.
> 
> Ah, it makes sense.  Not sure how I got it backwards then.  So my patch is
> pointless then?  I'll asked for it to be dropped.
Yes, it is backwards.

> 
> >From my previous discussions with folks, is that KVM was protected from
> this type of attack.  Is that still true?
> 
Copying Alex. He said that to use device assignment without interrupt
remapping customer needs to opt-in explicitly. Not sure what happens
with interrupt remapping but with x2apic disabled.

The problem is not limited to virtualization BTW. Any vfio user may
attack kernel without interrupt remapping so vfio has the same opt-in.
 
--
			Gleb.

  reply	other threads:[~2013-01-31 20:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-01-31 16:40 [PATCH] x86, x2apic: Only WARN on broken BIOSes inside a virtual guest Don Zickus
2013-01-31 18:52 ` Gleb Natapov
2013-01-31 19:34   ` Don Zickus
2013-01-31 20:00     ` Gleb Natapov [this message]
2013-01-31 20:52       ` Alex Williamson
2013-02-01 22:00         ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-02-01 22:57           ` [PATCH] intel_irq_remapping: Clean up x2apic optout security warning mess Andy Lutomirski
2013-02-03 19:29             ` [tip:x86/apic] x86/intel/irq_remapping: Clean up x2apic opt-out " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2013-02-04 18:20             ` [PATCH] intel_irq_remapping: Clean up x2apic optout " Don Zickus
2013-02-04 19:04             ` Alex Williamson
2013-02-04 19:19               ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-02-04 19:39                 ` Alex Williamson
2013-02-04 19:47                   ` Andy Lutomirski

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