From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1759297Ab3BLU6T (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 Feb 2013 15:58:19 -0500 Received: from mail.linuxfoundation.org ([140.211.169.12]:53637 "EHLO mail.linuxfoundation.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1755905Ab3BLUgM (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 Feb 2013 15:36:12 -0500 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Daniel Borkmann , Vlad Yasevich , "David S. Miller" Subject: [ 51/61] net: sctp: sctp_endpoint_free: zero out secret key data Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2013 12:35:11 -0800 Message-Id: <20130212203424.790204655@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.1.rc1.5.g7e0651a In-Reply-To: <20130212203417.890993903@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20130212203417.890993903@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.60-2.1.2 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 3.7-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Daniel Borkmann [ Upstream commit b5c37fe6e24eec194bb29d22fdd55d73bcc709bf ] On sctp_endpoint_destroy, previously used sensitive keying material should be zeroed out before the memory is returned, as we already do with e.g. auth keys when released. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/sctp/endpointola.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) --- a/net/sctp/endpointola.c +++ b/net/sctp/endpointola.c @@ -249,6 +249,8 @@ void sctp_endpoint_free(struct sctp_endp /* Final destructor for endpoint. */ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) { + int i; + SCTP_ASSERT(ep->base.dead, "Endpoint is not dead", return); /* Free up the HMAC transform. */ @@ -271,6 +273,9 @@ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_inq_free(&ep->base.inqueue); sctp_bind_addr_free(&ep->base.bind_addr); + for (i = 0; i < SCTP_HOW_MANY_SECRETS; ++i) + memset(&ep->secret_key[i], 0, SCTP_SECRET_SIZE); + /* Remove and free the port */ if (sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->bind_hash) sctp_put_port(ep->base.sk);