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Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2013 19:41:23 +0000
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
To: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>, Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
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        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Load keys from signed PE binaries
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On Tue, Feb 26, 2013 at 08:30:17PM +0100, Florian Weimer wrote:

> I'm sure many folks have read <http://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/12368.html>
> ("Implementing UEFI Secure Boot in Fedora", 2012-30-05) and similar
> analysis and came away with the impression of a rather open, automated
> signing process, like we had/have for ActiveX controls and Java
> Webstart applications.  This may have helped to increase acceptance of
> Microsoft Secure Boot in the technical community.  But lately, in
> direct contradiction to earlier descriptions of the process, a lot of
> talk about "obligations" has appeared.  I understand that you cannot
> go into specifics, but this situation is rather unfortunate for all of
> us.

It's open. If your code ends up signed and is then used to compromise 
the security of other signed operating systems, you're likely to be 
blacklisted. That can't surprise anyone, can it?

-- 
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@srcf.ucam.org