From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1755950AbbESNJa (ORCPT ); Tue, 19 May 2015 09:09:30 -0400 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:40579 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1755907AbbESNJZ (ORCPT ); Tue, 19 May 2015 09:09:25 -0400 Date: Tue, 19 May 2015 09:09:11 -0400 From: Richard Guy Briggs To: Paul Moore Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" , Linux API , Linux Containers , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , Andy Lutomirski , linux-audit@redhat.com, Al Viro , Network Development , Linux FS Devel , Eric Paris , "Serge E. Hallyn" Subject: Re: [PATCH V6 05/10] audit: log creation and deletion of namespace instances Message-ID: <20150519130911.GB20131@madcap2.tricolour.ca> References: <20150515023221.GC965@madcap2.tricolour.ca> <9125391.7ZiCneo6Xn@sifl> <555711FA.50703@redhat.com> <87r3qgpol6.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 15/05/16, Paul Moore wrote: > On Sat, May 16, 2015 at 10:46 AM, Eric W. Biederman > wrote: > > Paul Moore writes: > >> On Sat, May 16, 2015 at 5:46 AM, Daniel J Walsh wrote: > >>> On 05/15/2015 05:05 PM, Paul Moore wrote: > >>>> On Thursday, May 14, 2015 11:23:09 PM Andy Lutomirski wrote: > >>>>> On Thu, May 14, 2015 at 7:32 PM, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > >>>>>> On 15/05/14, Paul Moore wrote: > >>>>>>> * Look at our existing audit records to determine which records should > >>>>>>> have > >>>>>>> namespace and container ID tokens added. We may only want to add the > >>>>>>> additional fields in the case where the namespace/container ID tokens are > >>>>>>> not the init namespace. > >>>>>> If we have a record that ties a set of namespace IDs with a container > >>>>>> ID, then I expect we only need to list the containerID along with auid > >>>>>> and sessionID. > >>>>> The problem here is that the kernel has no concept of a "container", and I > >>>>> don't think it makes any sense to add one just for audit. "Container" is a > >>>>> marketing term used by some userspace tools. > >>>>> > >>>>> I can imagine that both audit could benefit from a concept of a > >>>>> namespace *path* that understands nesting (e.g. root/2/5/1 or > >>>>> something along those lines). Mapping these to "containers" belongs > >>>>> in userspace, I think. > >>>> It might be helpful to climb up a few levels in this thread ... > >>>> > >>>> I think we all agree that containers are not a kernel construct. I further > >>>> believe that the kernel has no business generating container IDs, those should > >>>> come from userspace and will likely be different depending on how you define > >>>> "container". However, what is less clear to me at this point is how the > >>>> kernel should handle the setting, reporting, and general management of this > >>>> container ID token. > >>>> > >>> Wouldn't the easiest thing be to just treat add a containerid to the > >>> process context like auid. > >> > >> I believe so. At least that was the point I was trying to get across > >> when I first jumped into this thread. > > > > It sounds nice but containers are not just a per process construct. > > Sometimes you might know anamespace but not which process instigated > > action to happen on that namespace. > > >From an auditing perspective I'm not sure we will ever hit those > cases; did you have a particular example in mind? The example that immediately came to mind when I first read Eric's comment was a packet coming in off a network in a particular network namespace. That could narrow it down to a subset of containers based on which network namespace it inhabits, but since it isn't associated with a particular task yet (other than a kernel thread) it will not be possible to select the precise nsproxy, let alone the container. > paul moore - RGB -- Richard Guy Briggs Senior Software Engineer, Kernel Security, AMER ENG Base Operating Systems, Red Hat Remote, Ottawa, Canada Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635, Alt: +1.613.693.0684x3545