Re: [PATCH] ptrace: being capable wrt a process requires mapped uids/gids

["Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>]

On Sat, Dec 12, 2015 at 09:12:41PM +0100, Jann Horn wrote:
> ptrace_has_cap() checks whether the current process should be
> treated as having a certain capability for ptrace checks
> against another process. Until now, this was equivalent to
> has_ns_capability(current, target_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE).
> 
> However, if a root-owned process wants to enter a user
> namespace for some reason without knowing who owns it and
> therefore can't change to the namespace owner's uid and gid
> before entering, as soon as it has entered the namespace,
> the namespace owner can attach to it via ptrace and thereby
> gain access to its uid and gid.
> 
> While it is possible for the entering process to switch to
> the uid of a claimed namespace owner before entering,
> causing the attempt to enter to fail if the claimed uid is
> wrong, this doesn't solve the problem of determining an
> appropriate gid.
> 
> With this change, the entering process can first enter the
> namespace and then safely inspect the namespace's
> properties, e.g. through /proc/self/{uid_map,gid_map},
> assuming that the namespace owner doesn't have access to
> uid 0.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>

Thanks, Jann!  This is indeed pretty high priority.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>

> ---
>  kernel/ptrace.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
>  1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
> index b760bae..c27770d 100644
> --- a/kernel/ptrace.c
> +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
> @@ -207,12 +207,32 @@ static int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, bool ignore_state)
>  	return ret;
>  }
>  
> -static int ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode)
> +static bool ptrace_has_cap(const struct cred *tcred, unsigned int mode)
>  {
> +	struct user_namespace *tns = tcred->user_ns;
> +	struct user_namespace *curns = current_cred()->user_ns;
> +
> +	/* When a root-owned process enters a user namespace created by a
> +	 * malicious user, the user shouldn't be able to execute code under
> +	 * uid 0 by attaching to the root-owned process via ptrace.
> +	 * Therefore, similar to the capable_wrt_inode_uidgid() check,
> +	 * verify that all the uids and gids of the target process are
> +	 * mapped into the current namespace.
> +	 * No fsuid/fsgid check because __ptrace_may_access doesn't do it
> +	 * either.
> +	 */
> +	if (!kuid_has_mapping(curns, tcred->euid) ||
> +			!kuid_has_mapping(curns, tcred->suid) ||
> +			!kuid_has_mapping(curns, tcred->uid)  ||
> +			!kgid_has_mapping(curns, tcred->egid) ||
> +			!kgid_has_mapping(curns, tcred->sgid) ||
> +			!kgid_has_mapping(curns, tcred->gid))
> +		return false;
> +
>  	if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT)
> -		return has_ns_capability_noaudit(current, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
> +		return has_ns_capability_noaudit(current, tns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
>  	else
> -		return has_ns_capability(current, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
> +		return has_ns_capability(current, tns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
>  }
>  
>  /* Returns 0 on success, -errno on denial. */
> @@ -241,7 +261,7 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
>  	    gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->sgid) &&
>  	    gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->gid))
>  		goto ok;
> -	if (ptrace_has_cap(tcred->user_ns, mode))
> +	if (ptrace_has_cap(tcred, mode))
>  		goto ok;
>  	rcu_read_unlock();
>  	return -EPERM;
> @@ -252,7 +272,7 @@ ok:
>  		dumpable = get_dumpable(task->mm);
>  	rcu_read_lock();
>  	if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER &&
> -	    !ptrace_has_cap(__task_cred(task)->user_ns, mode)) {
> +	    !ptrace_has_cap(__task_cred(task), mode)) {
>  		rcu_read_unlock();
>  		return -EPERM;
>  	}
> -- 
> 2.1.4
> 
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