From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1758145AbcEFLXt (ORCPT ); Fri, 6 May 2016 07:23:49 -0400 Received: from mga03.intel.com ([134.134.136.65]:17910 "EHLO mga03.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1758072AbcEFLXs (ORCPT ); Fri, 6 May 2016 07:23:48 -0400 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.24,587,1455004800"; d="scan'208";a="960180187" Date: Fri, 6 May 2016 14:23:34 +0300 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Ingo Molnar Cc: Andy Lutomirski , Pavel Machek , "linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" , Boris Ostrovsky , Thomas Gleixner , Greg KH , Mathias Krause , Borislav Petkov , "open list:STAGING SUBSYSTEM" , Wan Zongshun , Kristen Carlson Accardi , open list , Linus Torvalds , "H. Peter Anvin" , Peter Zijlstra Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6] Intel Secure Guard Extensions Message-ID: <20160506112334.GB24074@intel.com> References: <1461605698-12385-1-git-send-email-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> <20160426190009.GC8162@amd> <20160426194117.GA11111@amd> <20160426201154.GC11111@amd> <20160427081804.GC16991@gmail.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20160427081804.GC16991@gmail.com> Organization: Intel Finland Oy - BIC 0357606-4 - Westendinkatu 7, 02160 Espoo User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.24 (2015-08-30) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Apr 27, 2016 at 10:18:05AM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote: > > * Andy Lutomirski wrote: > > > > What new syscalls would be needed for ssh to get all this support? > > > > This patchset or similar, plus some user code and an enclave to use. > > > > Sadly, on current CPUs, you also need Intel to bless the enclave. It looks like > > new CPUs might relax that requirement. > > That looks like a fundamental technical limitation in my book - to an open source > user this is essentially a very similar capability as tboot: it only allows the > execution of externally blessed static binary blobs... > > I don't think we can merge any of this upstream until it's clear that the hardware > owner running open-source user-space can also freely define/start his own secure > enclaves without having to sign the enclave with any external party. I.e. > self-signed enclaves should be fundamentally supported as well. Post Skylake we will have a set of MSRs for defining your own root of trust: IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH. Andy had a concern that you could set root of trust multiple times, which could lead to potential attack scenarios. These MSRs are one-shot. ENCLS will fail if the launch control is locked. There's no possiblity to have a root of trust that is unlocked. > Thanks, > > Ingo /Jarkko