From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753398AbcFFXNs (ORCPT ); Mon, 6 Jun 2016 19:13:48 -0400 Received: from imap.thunk.org ([74.207.234.97]:48640 "EHLO imap.thunk.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751884AbcFFXNq (ORCPT ); Mon, 6 Jun 2016 19:13:46 -0400 Date: Mon, 6 Jun 2016 19:13:19 -0400 From: "Theodore Ts'o" To: PaX Team Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, David Brown , emese Revfy , Andrew Morton , spender@grsecurity.net, mmarek@suse.com, keescook@chromium.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, yamada.masahiro@socionext.com, linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, axboe@kernel.dk, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com, mingo@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de, bart.vanassche@sandisk.com, davem@davemloft.net Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] Add the latent_entropy gcc plugin Message-ID: <20160606231319.GC7057@thunk.org> Mail-Followup-To: Theodore Ts'o , PaX Team , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, David Brown , emese Revfy , Andrew Morton , spender@grsecurity.net, mmarek@suse.com, keescook@chromium.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, yamada.masahiro@socionext.com, linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, axboe@kernel.dk, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com, mingo@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de, bart.vanassche@sandisk.com, davem@davemloft.net References: <20160531013029.4c5db8b570d86527b0b53fe4@gmail.com> <20160603194252.91064b8e682ad988283fc569@gmail.com> <20160606133801.GA6136@davidb.org> <5755CF44.24670.9C7568D@pageexec.freemail.hu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <5755CF44.24670.9C7568D@pageexec.freemail.hu> User-Agent: Mutt/1.6.0 (2016-04-01) X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: tytso@thunk.org X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on imap.thunk.org); SAEximRunCond expanded to false Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Mon, Jun 06, 2016 at 09:30:12PM +0200, PaX Team wrote: > > what matters for latent entropy is not the actual values fed into the entropy > pool (they're effectively compile time constants save for runtime data dependent > computations) but the precise sequence of them. interrupts stir this sequence > and thus extract entropy. perhaps as a small example imagine that an uninterrupted > kernel boot sequence feeds these values into the entropy pool: > A B C > > now imagine that a single interrupt can occur around any one of these values: > I A B C > A I B C > A B I C > A B C I > > this way we can obtain 4 different final pool states that translate into up > to 2 bits of latent entropy (depends on how probable each sequence is). note > that this works regardless whether the underlying hardware has a high resolution > timer whose values the interrupt handler would feed into the pool. Right, but if it's only about interrupts, we're doing this already inside modern Linux kernels. On every single interrupt we are mixing into a per-CPU "fast mix" pool the IP from the interrupt registers. Since we're not claiming any additional entropy, I suppose it won't hurt to do it twice, two different ways, but I'm not sure how much it will actually help, and by doing the instrumentation in every single basic block, instead of in the interrupt handler, I would think it would be cheaper to do it in the interrupt handler. - Ted