From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1424373AbcFHKHV (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Jun 2016 06:07:21 -0400 Received: from mail-wm0-f49.google.com ([74.125.82.49]:36586 "EHLO mail-wm0-f49.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1161918AbcFHKHQ (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Jun 2016 06:07:16 -0400 Date: Wed, 8 Jun 2016 11:07:13 +0100 From: Matt Fleming To: Tom Lendacky Cc: Borislav Petkov , Leif Lindholm , Mark Salter , Daniel Kiper , linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, Radim =?utf-8?B?S3LEjW3DocWZ?= , Arnd Bergmann , Jonathan Corbet , Joerg Roedel , Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk , Paolo Bonzini , Ingo Molnar , "H. Peter Anvin" , Andrey Ryabinin , Alexander Potapenko , Thomas Gleixner , Dmitry Vyukov , Ard Biesheuvel Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 10/18] x86/efi: Access EFI related tables in the clear Message-ID: <20160608100713.GU2658@codeblueprint.co.uk> References: <20160426225553.13567.19459.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> <20160426225740.13567.85438.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> <20160510134358.GR2839@codeblueprint.co.uk> <20160510135758.GA16783@pd.tnic> <5734C97D.8060803@amd.com> <57446B27.20406@amd.com> <20160525193011.GC2984@codeblueprint.co.uk> <5746FE16.9070408@amd.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <5746FE16.9070408@amd.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.24+41 (02bc14ed1569) (2015-08-30) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (Sorry for the delay) On Thu, 26 May, at 08:45:58AM, Tom Lendacky wrote: > > The patch in question is patch 6/18 where PAGE_KERNEL is changed to > include the _PAGE_ENC attribute (the encryption mask). This now > makes FIXMAP_PAGE_NORMAL contain the encryption mask while > FIXMAP_PAGE_IO does not. In this way, anything mapped using the > early_ioremap call won't be mapped encrypted. There are semantics attached to early_ioremap() that do not apply in this case; that you're mapping an MMIO region but for EFI we just care about noting where the firmware (not the kernel) populated the region with data. Similar problems exist for other early boot code such as the devicetree stuff. early_ioremap() is not the answer. What you really want is just some way to distinguish kernel-owned regions from those owned by "somebody else". I have no problem updating early_memremap() to take a @flags argument to make that distinction, provided that the naming is generic and not tied to AMD's SME technology via an "sme" prefix/suffix. And making it generic should allow it to be easily sprinkled into the shared architecture code in drivers/firmware/efi/ without issue. I'm going to follow up with some additional comments/questions on PATCH 10.