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From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <>
To: Daniel Micay <>
	Kees Cook <>, Ingo Molnar <>,
	Alexander Shishkin <>,, Jiri Olsa <>,
	Thomas Gleixner <>,
	Namhyung Kim <>,
	David Ahern <>,
	LKML <>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] security,perf: Allow further restriction of perf_event_open
Date: Fri, 17 Jun 2016 17:00:50 -0300
Message-ID: <> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <>

Em Fri, Jun 17, 2016 at 12:16:47PM -0400, Daniel Micay escreveu:
> On Fri, 2016-06-17 at 08:54 +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > This Changelog is completely devoid of information. _WHY_ are you
> > doing this?
> Attack surface reduction. It's possible to use seccomp-bpf for some
> limited cases, but it's not flexible enough. There are lots of
> information leaks and local privilege escalation vulnerabilities via
> perf events, yet on most Linux installs it's not ever being used. So
> turning it off by default on those installs is an easy win. The holes
> are reduced to root -> kernel (and that's not a meaningful boundary in
> mainline right now - although as is the case here, Debian has a bunch of
> securelevel patches for that).

Is ptrace also disabled on such systems, or any of the other more recent
syscalls? The same arguments could probably be used to disable those:
reduce attack surface, possibly the new ones have bugs as they are
relatively new and it takes a long time for new syscalls to be more
generally used, if we go on disabling them in such a way, they will
probably never get used :-\

Wouldn't the recent bump in perf_event_paranoid to 2 enough? I.e. only
allow profiling of user tasks?

Or is there something more specific that we should disable/constrain to
reduce such surface contact without using such a big hammer?

- Arnaldo

  reply index

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-01-11 15:19 [PATCH 0/2] Document and extend kernel.perf_event_paranoid Ben Hutchings
2016-01-11 15:21 ` [PATCH 1/2] Documentation,perf: Document the perf sysctls Ben Hutchings
2016-01-11 15:23 ` [PATCH 2/2] security,perf: Allow further restriction of perf_event_open Ben Hutchings
2016-04-13 16:12   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-06-04 20:56     ` Jeffrey Vander Stoep
     [not found]     ` <>
2016-06-16 22:27       ` Kees Cook
2016-06-17  6:54         ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-06-17 16:16           ` Daniel Micay
2016-06-17 20:00             ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo [this message]
2016-06-18  0:51               ` Daniel Micay
2016-06-17  5:56   ` Alexander Shishkin
2016-06-17 12:18     ` Ben Hutchings
2016-06-17 15:24     ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Micay
2016-01-19 21:35 ` [PATCH RESEND] perf: Document the perf sysctls Ben Hutchings
2016-01-21 14:25   ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2016-02-03 10:08   ` [tip:perf/core] perf tools: " tip-bot for Ben Hutchings

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