On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 07:01:13PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > On an unrelated note, can we please lock down all the silly historical > *userspace* info leaks in /proc? Nasty ones include: net, cmdline (at > the very least, only argv[0] should be visible if the reader lacks > ptrace access). > > Less nasty ones include: limits, sched, autogroup, comm, wchan, > schedstat, cpuset, cgroup, oom_*, sessionid, coredump_filter If that doesn't break stuff, I'm very much in favor of it. > uid_map, gid_map, etc are just screwed up. They should be per > *namespace* somewhere, and they should require creds on the namespace. What do you have in mind? Something like /proc/namespaces/user:123456/{uid_map,gid_map,setgroups,parent_ns}, with jumped fake symlinks to the directory and its entries in /proc/$pid/? > timerslack is totally fscked up -- it allows ugo to write and it > checks the wrong creds. Jann, does your series fix that? Nope. Never noticed that thing so far, probably because it was only added a few months ago. :/ Will add it to my series.