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From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
To: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	"Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	David Windsor <dave@progbits.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 7/7] kref: Implement using refcount_t
Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2016 10:07:37 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161116090736.GA31395@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20161116085130.GA26208@kroah.com>


* Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> On Wed, Nov 16, 2016 at 09:31:55AM +0100, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> > So what I'd love to see is to have a kernel option that re-introduces some 
> > historic root (and other) holes that can be exploited deterministically - 
> > obviously default disabled.
> 
> Ick, I don't want to have to support nasty #ifdefs for
> "CONFIG_TOTALLY_INSECURE" type options in code logic for the next 20+
> years, do you?

I'd write it in C, not CPP, so it would be an 'if', but yeah, it would be extra 
code otherwise.

So I'd restrict this strictly to cases:

 - Where the maintainer absolutely agrees to carry it.

 - Where it's still easy to do technically - for example a single unobtrusive 
   'if' condition or so, in cases where the current upstream code still has a 
   similar structure conductive to the re-introducion of the bug. Such testcases
   can be dropped the moment they interfere with active development.

 - Plus an additional approach could be that some of the typical holes can be
   reproduced in completely separate code that is not seen by anyone who doesn't 
   want to see it.

I doubt many bugs have 20 years life times in face of frequent code reorganization 
- and if code is static for 20 years then there won't be much extra maintenance 
overhead, right?

> > I'd restrict this to reasonably 'deterministic' holes, and the exploits themselves 
> > could be somewhere in tools/. (Obviously only where the maintainers agree to host 
> > the code.) They wouldn't give a root shell, they'd only test whether they reached 
> > uid0 (or some other elevated privilege).
> 
> Having exploits in tools/ would be good, I would like to see that, as
> then we can ensure that we don't ever introduce old problems that we
> have fixed again in the future.  That I have no objection to.

Heh, I actually guessed that this would be the more contentious part of my 
suggestion - go figure! ;-)

Thanks,

	Ingo

  reply	other threads:[~2016-11-16  9:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 96+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-11-14 17:39 [RFC][PATCH 0/7] kref improvements Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-14 17:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 1/7] kref: Add KREF_INIT() Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-14 17:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 2/7] kref: Add kref_read() Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-14 18:16   ` Christoph Hellwig
2016-11-15  7:28     ` Greg KH
2016-11-15  7:47       ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-15  8:37       ` [PATCH] printk, locking/atomics, kref: Introduce new %pAr and %pAk format string options for atomic_t and 'struct kref' Ingo Molnar
2016-11-15  8:43         ` [PATCH v2] " Ingo Molnar
2016-11-15  9:21           ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-15  9:41             ` [PATCH v3] printk, locking/atomics, kref: Introduce new %pAa " Ingo Molnar
2016-11-15 10:10           ` [PATCH v2] printk, locking/atomics, kref: Introduce new %pAr " kbuild test robot
2016-11-15 16:42         ` [PATCH] " Linus Torvalds
2016-11-16  8:13           ` Ingo Molnar
2016-11-15  7:33   ` [RFC][PATCH 2/7] kref: Add kref_read() Greg KH
2016-11-15  8:03     ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-15 20:53       ` Kees Cook
2016-11-16  8:21         ` Greg KH
2016-11-16 10:10           ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-16 10:18             ` Greg KH
2016-11-16 10:11           ` Daniel Borkmann
2016-11-16 10:19             ` Greg KH
2016-11-16 10:09         ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-16 18:58           ` Kees Cook
2016-11-17  8:34             ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-17 12:30               ` David Windsor
2016-11-17 12:43                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-17 13:01                   ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-11-17 13:22                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-17 15:42                       ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-11-17 18:02                       ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-11-17 19:10                         ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-17 19:29                         ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-17 19:34               ` Kees Cook
2016-11-14 17:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 3/7] kref: Kill kref_sub() Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-14 17:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 4/7] kref: Use kref_get_unless_zero() more Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-14 17:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 5/7] kref: Implement kref_put_lock() Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-14 20:35   ` Kees Cook
2016-11-15  7:50     ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-14 17:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 6/7] kref: Avoid more abuse Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-14 17:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 7/7] kref: Implement using refcount_t Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-15  8:40   ` Ingo Molnar
2016-11-15  9:47     ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-15 10:03       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-11-15 10:46         ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-15 13:03           ` Ingo Molnar
2016-11-15 18:06             ` Kees Cook
2016-11-15 19:16               ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-15 19:23                 ` Kees Cook
2016-11-16  8:31                   ` Ingo Molnar
2016-11-16  8:51                     ` Greg KH
2016-11-16  9:07                       ` Ingo Molnar [this message]
2016-11-16  9:24                         ` Greg KH
2016-11-16 10:15                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-16 18:55                       ` Kees Cook
2016-11-17  8:33                         ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-17 19:50                           ` Kees Cook
2016-11-16 18:41                     ` Kees Cook
2016-11-15 12:33   ` Boqun Feng
2016-11-15 13:01     ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-15 14:19       ` Boqun Feng
2016-11-17  9:28         ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-17  9:48           ` Boqun Feng
2016-11-17 10:29             ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-17 10:39               ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-17 11:03                 ` Greg KH
2016-11-17 12:48                   ` Peter Zijlstra
     [not found]               ` <CAL0jBu-GnREUPSX4kUDp-Cc8ZGp6+Cb2q0HVandswcLzPRnChQ@mail.gmail.com>
2016-11-17 12:08                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-17 12:08           ` Will Deacon
2016-11-17 16:11             ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-17 16:36               ` Will Deacon
2016-11-18  8:26                 ` Boqun Feng
2016-11-18 10:16                   ` Will Deacon
2016-11-18 10:07   ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-11-18 11:37     ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-18 17:06       ` Will Deacon
2016-11-18 18:57         ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-21  4:06         ` Boqun Feng
2016-11-21  7:48           ` Ingo Molnar
2016-11-21  8:38             ` Boqun Feng
2016-11-21  8:44       ` Boqun Feng
2016-11-21  9:02         ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-21  9:37           ` Boqun Feng
2016-11-18 10:47   ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-11-18 10:52     ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-18 16:58       ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-11-18 18:53         ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-19  7:14           ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-11-19 11:45             ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-01-26 23:14   ` Kees Cook
2017-01-27  9:58     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-01-27 21:07       ` Kees Cook
2017-01-30 13:40         ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-15  7:27 ` [RFC][PATCH 0/7] kref improvements Greg KH
2016-11-15  7:42   ` Ingo Molnar
2016-11-15 15:05     ` Greg KH
2016-11-15  7:48   ` Peter Zijlstra

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