From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1] security: Add a new hook: inode_touch_atime
Date: Thu, 22 Dec 2016 01:06:52 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161222090652.GA8715@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <585B95C2.5050801@digikod.net>
On Thu, Dec 22, 2016 at 09:58:42AM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> Of course a read-only mount point can do the trick (except for anonymous
> inodes). However, a security policy (e.g. for SELinux) should not (and
> can't always) rely on mount options. For example, a security policy can
> come from a distro but they may not want to tie mount options with this
> policy. We may also not want a sandbox to being able to change mount
> options (even with user namespaces).
>
> Being able to write (meta-)data, whereas a security policy said that
> it's not allowed, seems like a flaw in this policy. Moreover, modifying
> access time is an easy way to create cover-channels without any LSM
> being able to notice it.
A security policy must not mess with the readonly state of a file system
or mount, period. You're overstepping your boundaries.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-12-22 9:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-12-21 23:15 [PATCH v1] security: Add a new hook: inode_touch_atime Mickaël Salaün
2016-12-21 23:33 ` Casey Schaufler
2016-12-22 0:01 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-12-22 0:30 ` Casey Schaufler
2016-12-22 0:57 ` Al Viro
2016-12-22 8:58 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-12-22 9:06 ` Christoph Hellwig [this message]
2016-12-22 6:25 ` Christoph Hellwig
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