From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>,
"AKASHI, Takahiro" <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>,
park jinbum <jinb.park7@gmail.com>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, spender@grsecurity.net
Subject: Re: [PATCH] gcc-plugins: Add structleak for more stack initialization
Date: Wed, 18 Jan 2017 10:48:58 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170118104857.GA3231@leverpostej> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <587E686E.29386.DA7FA27@pageexec.freemail.hu>
On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 07:54:38PM +0100, PaX Team wrote:
> On 17 Jan 2017 at 17:48, Mark Rutland wrote:
> > That being the case, (and given the relevant bug has now been fixed),
> > it's not clear to me what the value of this is today. i.e. given the
> > general case, is this preventing many leaks?
>
> no idea, i stopped looking at the instrumentation log long ago, but everyone
> can enable the debug output (has a very specific comment on it ;) and look at
> the results. i keep this plugin around because it costs nothing to maintain
> it and the alternative (better) solution doesn't exist yet.
Fair enough; understood.
> > > i never went into that direction because i think the security goal can
> > > be achieved without the performance impact of forced initialization.
> >
> > Was there a particular technique you had in mind?
>
> sure, i mentioned it in my SSTIC'12 keynote (page 36):
> https://pax.grsecurity.net/docs/PaXTeam-SSTIC12-keynote-20-years-of-PaX.pdf
Thanks for the pointer.
I'm probably being very naive here, but IIUC the per-task usercopy stack
would require roughly the same analysis to identify relevant variables,
unless all local variables (regardless of initialisation) that fed into
a usercopy would be on the usercopy stack?
Regardless, I can see the benefit of cleanly separating that data from
the rest of the kernel data.
Thanks,
Mark.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-01-18 11:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-01-13 22:02 [PATCH] gcc-plugins: Add structleak for more stack initialization Kees Cook
2017-01-14 10:03 ` PaX Team
2017-01-16 15:24 ` Mark Rutland
2017-01-16 19:08 ` Daniel Micay
2017-01-16 19:30 ` PaX Team
2017-01-17 17:48 ` Mark Rutland
2017-01-17 18:54 ` PaX Team
2017-01-18 10:48 ` Mark Rutland [this message]
2017-01-17 17:48 ` Kees Cook
2017-01-16 11:54 ` Mark Rutland
2017-01-16 12:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-01-16 19:22 ` PaX Team
2017-01-17 10:42 ` Dave P Martin
[not found] ` <587E4FDD.31940.D47F642@pageexec.freemail.hu>
2017-01-17 18:07 ` Dave P Martin
2017-01-17 19:25 ` PaX Team
2017-01-17 22:04 ` Dave P Martin
2017-01-17 17:56 ` Kees Cook
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