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From: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, matthew.garrett@nebula.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 20/24] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
Date: Thu, 6 Apr 2017 08:29:09 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170406122907.GA53880@ast-mbp.thefacebook.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <149142344547.5101.4518618716303032193.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

On Wed, Apr 05, 2017 at 09:17:25PM +0100, David Howells wrote:
> From: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>
> 
> There are some bpf functions can be used to read kernel memory:
> bpf_probe_read, bpf_probe_write_user and bpf_trace_printk.  These allow
> private keys in kernel memory (e.g. the hibernation image signing key) to
> be read by an eBPF program.  Prohibit those functions when the kernel is
> locked down.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
> ---
> 
>  kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c |   11 +++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
> index cee9802cf3e0..7fde851f207b 100644
> --- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
> +++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
> @@ -65,6 +65,11 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read, void *, dst, u32, size, const void *, unsafe_ptr)
>  {
>  	int ret;
>  
> +	if (kernel_is_locked_down()) {
> +		memset(dst, 0, size);
> +		return -EPERM;
> +	}

this will obviously break the program. How about disabling loading tracing
programs during the lockdown completely?

Also is there a description of what this lockdown trying to accomplish?
The cover letter is scarce in details.

  reply	other threads:[~2017-04-06 12:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 82+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-04-05 20:14 [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-04-05 20:14 ` [PATCH 01/24] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit David Howells
2017-04-06  8:26   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-04-06  8:48   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:14 ` [PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells
2017-04-05 20:14 ` [PATCH 03/24] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 05/24] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when " David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode David Howells
2017-04-14 18:05   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-04-14 18:15     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-04-14 23:16     ` David Howells
2017-04-16 20:46     ` Matt Fleming
2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 07/24] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-04-07  3:07   ` Dave Young
2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 08/24] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set David Howells
2017-04-07  3:05   ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  3:49     ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07  6:19       ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  7:45         ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07  8:01           ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  7:07       ` David Howells
2017-04-07  7:41         ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  8:28           ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07  8:42             ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  7:09     ` David Howells
2017-04-07  7:46       ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07  9:17       ` David Howells
2017-04-07 12:36         ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-10 13:19         ` David Howells
2017-05-02 19:01           ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 10/24] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: " David Howells
2017-04-05 23:38   ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-06  6:39     ` Oliver Neukum
2017-04-06  8:41     ` David Howells
2017-04-06 20:09       ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-06 20:12         ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-06 20:25           ` Jiri Kosina
2017-04-08  3:28             ` poma
2017-04-12 13:44               ` joeyli
2017-04-06  6:55   ` David Howells
2017-04-06 20:07     ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 12/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access " David Howells
2017-04-18 17:50   ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 13/24] x86: Lock down IO port " David Howells
2017-04-14 18:28   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 14/24] x86: Restrict MSR " David Howells
2017-04-14 18:30   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " David Howells
2017-04-07 10:25   ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-04-07 12:50   ` David Howells
2017-04-09 11:10     ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-04-10 13:16     ` David Howells
2017-04-18  6:06       ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-04-18 14:34         ` Ben Hutchings
2017-04-18 14:55         ` David Howells
2017-04-18 15:19           ` Ben Hutchings
2017-04-18 15:34           ` David Howells
2017-04-18 15:30         ` David Howells
2017-04-18 17:39           ` Ben Hutchings
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 16/24] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " David Howells
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 17/24] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " David Howells
2017-04-06 19:43   ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-07  6:31     ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  7:05     ` David Howells
2017-04-07  7:39       ` Dave Young
2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 18/24] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 19/24] acpi: Disable APEI error injection " David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 20/24] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when " David Howells
2017-04-06 12:29   ` Alexei Starovoitov [this message]
2017-04-06 12:40     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-04-12 14:57   ` joeyli
2017-04-13  8:46   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 21/24] scsi: Lock down the eata driver David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 22/24] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 23/24] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL David Howells
2017-04-05 20:18 ` [PATCH 24/24] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) David Howells
2017-04-07 15:59 ` [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown Austin S. Hemmelgarn
2017-04-07 16:29   ` Justin Forbes
2017-04-10 23:15 ` Why kernel lockdown? David Howells

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