From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1035557AbdDUFYe (ORCPT ); Fri, 21 Apr 2017 01:24:34 -0400 Received: from h2.hallyn.com ([78.46.35.8]:34806 "EHLO h2.hallyn.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1031682AbdDUFYb (ORCPT ); Fri, 21 Apr 2017 01:24:31 -0400 Date: Fri, 21 Apr 2017 00:24:28 -0500 From: "Serge E. Hallyn" To: Matt Brown Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" , jmorris@namei.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, jslaby@suse.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org, jannh@google.com, keescook@chromium.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH] make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN Message-ID: <20170421052428.GA24939@mail.hallyn.com> References: <20170419034526.18565-1-matt@nmatt.com> <20170419045813.GA17990@mail.hallyn.com> <20170419235342.GA2305@mail.hallyn.com> <59d67e42-3532-6001-91cb-067bff1eec64@nmatt.com> <20170420151928.GA14559@mail.hallyn.com> <0b6cec15f206329fc523983534baaf0d@nmatt.com> <20170420174100.GA16822@mail.hallyn.com> <8e755f85-6947-cb52-003d-11f1d9a886da@nmatt.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <8e755f85-6947-cb52-003d-11f1d9a886da@nmatt.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Fri, Apr 21, 2017 at 01:09:59AM -0400, Matt Brown wrote: > On 04/20/2017 01:41 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > >Quoting matt@nmatt.com (matt@nmatt.com): > >>On 2017-04-20 11:19, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > >>>Quoting Matt Brown (matt@nmatt.com): > >>>>On 04/19/2017 07:53 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > >>>>>Quoting Matt Brown (matt@nmatt.com): > >>>>>>On 04/19/2017 12:58 AM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > >>>>>>>On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 11:45:26PM -0400, Matt Brown wrote: > >>>>>>>>This patch reproduces GRKERNSEC_HARDEN_TTY functionality from the grsecurity > >>>>>>>>project in-kernel. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>This will create the Kconfig SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT and the corresponding > >>>>>>>>sysctl kernel.tiocsti_restrict that, when activated, restrict all TIOCSTI > >>>>>>>>ioctl calls from non CAP_SYS_ADMIN users. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>Possible effects on userland: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>There could be a few user programs that would be effected by this > >>>>>>>>change. > >>>>>>>>See: > >>>>>>>>notable programs are: agetty, csh, xemacs and tcsh > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>However, I still believe that this change is worth it given that the > >>>>>>>>Kconfig defaults to n. This will be a feature that is turned on for the > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>It's not worthless, but note that for instance before this was fixed > >>>>>>>in lxc, this patch would not have helped with escapes from privileged > >>>>>>>containers. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>I assume you are talking about this CVE: > >>>>>>https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1411256 > >>>>>> > >>>>>>In retrospect, is there any way that an escape from a privileged > >>>>>>container with the this bug could have been prevented? > >>>>> > >>>>>I don't know, that's what I was probing for. Detecting that the pgrp > >>>>>or session - heck, the pid namespace - has changed would seem like a > >>>>>good indicator that it shouldn't be able to push. > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>>pgrp and session won't do because in the case we are discussing > >>>>current->signal->tty is the same as tty. > >>>> > >>>>This is the current check that is already in place: > >>>>| if ((current->signal->tty != tty) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) > >>>>| return -EPERM; > >>> > >>>Yeah... > >>> > >>>>The only thing I could find to detect the tty message coming from a > >>>>container is as follows: > >>>>| task_active_pid_ns(current)->level > >>>> > >>>>This will be zero when run on the host, but 1 when run inside a > >>>>container. However this is very much a hack and could probably break > >>>>some userland stuff where there are multiple levels of namespaces. > >>> > >>>Yes. This is also however why I don't like the current patch, because > >>>capable() will never be true in a container, so nested containers > >>>break. > >>> > >> > >>What do you mean by "capable() will never be true in a container"? > >>My understanding > >>is that if a container is given CAP_SYS_ADMIN then > >>capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) will return > >>true? > > > >No, capable(X) checks for X with respect to the initial user namespace. > >So for root-owned containers it will be true, but containers running in > >non-initial user namespaces cannot pass that check. > > > >To check for privilege with respect to another user namespace, you need > >to use ns_capable. But for that you need a user_ns to target. > > > > How about: ns_capable(current_user_ns(),CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ? > > current_user_ns() was found in include/linux/cred.h Any user can create a new user namespace and pass the above check. What we want is to find the user namespace which opened the tty.