From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S973343AbdDXQPr (ORCPT ); Mon, 24 Apr 2017 12:15:47 -0400 Received: from foss.arm.com ([217.140.101.70]:58892 "EHLO foss.arm.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1173367AbdDXQOw (ORCPT ); Mon, 24 Apr 2017 12:14:52 -0400 Date: Mon, 24 Apr 2017 17:14:42 +0100 From: Catalin Marinas To: Will Deacon Cc: Mark Rutland , Peter Maydell , "dongbo (E)" , Peter Maydell , Linuxarm , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , Al Viro , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, arm-mail-list Subject: Re: [PATCH] fs: Preventing READ_IMPLIES_EXEC Propagation Message-ID: <20170424161441.GI25449@e104818-lin.cambridge.arm.com> References: <1492088223-98232-1-git-send-email-zhangshaokun@hisilicon.com> <2414e3b3-03f6-bd6c-5aa4-ad58c66b5aa5@huawei.com> <20170418170118.GH27592@e104818-lin.cambridge.arm.com> <20170419103313.GA3238@e104818-lin.cambridge.arm.com> <20170424154023.GM12323@arm.com> <20170424155841.GH25449@e104818-lin.cambridge.arm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20170424155841.GH25449@e104818-lin.cambridge.arm.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.23 (2014-03-12) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Mon, Apr 24, 2017 at 04:58:41PM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote: > On Mon, Apr 24, 2017 at 04:40:23PM +0100, Will Deacon wrote: > > On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 11:33:14AM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote: > > > On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 09:01:52PM +0100, Peter Maydell wrote: > > > > On 18 April 2017 at 18:01, Catalin Marinas wrote: > > > > > On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 08:33:52PM +0800, dongbo (E) wrote: > > > > >> From: Dong Bo > > > > >> > > > > >> In load_elf_binary(), once the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC flag is set, > > > > >> the flag is propagated to its child processes, even the elf > > > > >> files are marked as not requiring executable stack. It may > > > > >> cause superfluous operations on some arch, e.g. > > > > >> __sync_icache_dcache on aarch64 due to a PROT_READ mmap is > > > > >> also marked as PROT_EXEC. > > > > > > > > > That's affecting most architectures with a risk of ABI breakage. We > > > > > could do it on arm64 only, though I'm not yet clear on the ABI > > > > > implications (at a first look, there shouldn't be any). > > > > > > > > Is there a reason why it isn't just straightforwardly a bug > > > > (which we could fix) to make READ_IMPLIES_EXEC propagate to > > > > child processes? > > > > > > While I agree that it looks like a bug, if there are user programs > > > relying on such bug we call it "ABI". On arm64, I don't think there is > > > anything relying on inheriting READ_IMPLIES_EXEC but I wouldn't change > > > the compat task handling without the corresponding change in arch/arm. > > > > > > > AFAICT this should be per-process: just because > > > > init happens not to have been (re)compiled to permit non-executable > > > > stacks doesn't mean every process on the system needs to have > > > > an executable stack. > > > > > > I think this also affects the heap if brk(2) is used (via > > > VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS though I guess malloc mostly uses mmap these > > > days). > > > > I think it also affects mprotect, which is more worrying imo, particularly > > for things like JIT code that is ported from 32-bit (although a quick look > > at v8, ionmonkey and art suggests they all pass PROT_EXEC when needed). > > As Peter said, the default behaviour is READ_IMPLIES_EXEC off, For the record, just to clarify the "default" behaviour: what I meant is that the (newish) toolchain always generates the GNU_STACK header which disables the executable stack (and therefore READ_IMPLIES_EXEC is off). -- Catalin