From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S968743AbdD0Qwy (ORCPT ); Thu, 27 Apr 2017 12:52:54 -0400 Received: from h2.hallyn.com ([78.46.35.8]:39030 "EHLO h2.hallyn.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S965029AbdD0Qws (ORCPT ); Thu, 27 Apr 2017 12:52:48 -0400 Date: Thu, 27 Apr 2017 11:52:45 -0500 From: "Serge E. Hallyn" To: "Eric W. Biederman" Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" , Seth Forshee , lkml , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Kees Cook , Andreas Gruenbacher , Andy Lutomirski , "Andrew G. Morgan" Subject: Re: [PATCH] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities Message-ID: <20170427165245.GA794@mail.hallyn.com> References: <20170419164824.GA27843@mail.hallyn.com> <87wpadpb3m.fsf@xmission.com> <20170422151412.GA14861@mail.hallyn.com> <87vapwncws.fsf@xmission.com> <87r30d255v.fsf@xmission.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <87r30d255v.fsf@xmission.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm@xmission.com): > ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) writes: > > > "Serge E. Hallyn" writes: > > > >> Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm@xmission.com): > >>> > >>> "Serge E. Hallyn" writes: > >>> > >>> > diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c > >>> > index 7e3317c..75cc65a 100644 > >>> > --- a/fs/xattr.c > >>> > +++ b/fs/xattr.c > >>> > @@ -170,12 +170,29 @@ int __vfs_setxattr_noperm(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, > >>> > const void *value, size_t size, int flags) > >>> > { > >>> > struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; > >>> > - int error = -EAGAIN; > >>> > + int error; > >>> > + void *wvalue = NULL; > >>> > + size_t wsize = 0; > >>> > int issec = !strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, > >>> > XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN); > >>> > > >>> > - if (issec) > >>> > + if (issec) { > >>> > inode->i_flags &= ~S_NOSEC; > >>> > + > >>> > + if (!strcmp(name, "security.capability")) { > >>> > + error = cap_setxattr_convert_nscap(dentry, value, size, > >>> > + &wvalue, &wsize); > >>> > + if (error < 0) > >>> > + return error; > >>> > + if (wvalue) { > >>> > + value = wvalue; > >>> > + size = wsize; > >>> > + } > >>> > + } > >>> > + } > >>> > + > >>> > + error = -EAGAIN; > >>> > + > >>> > >>> Why is the conversion in __vfs_setxattr_noperm and not in setattr as > >>> was done for posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user? > >> > >> I think I was thinking I wanted to catch all the vfs_setxattr operations, > >> but I don't think that's right. Moving to setxattr seems right. I'll > >> look around a bit more. > > > > Thanks. This is one of these little details that we want a good answer > > to why there. If you can document that in your patch description when > > you resend I would appreciate it. > > Ok. Grrr. > > Looking at this a little more getting it correct where we call the > conversion operation is critical. > > I believe the current placement of cap_setxattr_convert_nscap is > actively wrong. In particular unless I am misleading something this > will trigger multiple conversions when setting one of these attributes > on overlayfs. > > The stragey I adopted for for posix acls is: > > On a write from userspace convert from current_user_ns() to &init_user_ns. > On a write to the filesystem convert from &init_user_ns to fs_user_ns. > > On a read from the filesystem convert from fs_user_ns to &init_user_ns > On a read from the kernel to userspace convert from &init_user_ns > to current_user_ns(). > > Overall a good strategy but no one we can trivially adopt for the > capability xattr as the second write to filesystem method does not > appear to actually exist for anything except for posix acls. > > I need to think a little more about how we want to accomplish this for > the capability xattr. My apoligies for leading you down a path that has > all of these bumps and then being sufficiently distracted not to help > you through this maze. > > The only easy solution I can see is to just always keep things in > &init_user_ns inside the kernel. That works until we bring fuse or > other unprivileged mounts onboard that have storage outside of the > kernel. > > Seth and I will have to rework that for fuse support but that sounds > better than not letting such an issue prevent us from merging the code. Ok, in the meantime I've made a few updates in my tree which I think make the code a lot nicer (and do move the conversion to setxattr()), but there's a bug in that which I'm still trying to nail down. I'll send a new version when I get that figured, and we can see how close to ok that is. Note that upstream cap_inode_removexattr and cap_inode_setxattr() upstream still don't respect the fs_user_ns properly either (the proper code is in the Ubuntu kernel, maybe it's in your -next tree, I don't know how you and Seth are coordinating that) -serge