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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Theodore Tso <tytso@mit.edu>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.4 16/20] ext4 crypto: revalidate dentry after adding or removing the key
Date: Fri,  5 May 2017 11:33:06 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170505183231.572456338@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170505183230.937615081@linuxfoundation.org>

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>

commit 28b4c263961c47da84ed8b5be0b5116bad1133eb upstream.

Add a validation check for dentries for encrypted directory to make
sure we're not caching stale data after a key has been added or removed.

Also check to make sure that status of the encryption key is updated
when readdir(2) is executed.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/ext4/crypto.c |   50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 fs/ext4/dir.c    |    6 ++++++
 fs/ext4/ext4.h   |    1 +
 fs/ext4/namei.c  |   18 ++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 75 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/ext4/crypto.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/crypto.c
@@ -469,3 +469,53 @@ uint32_t ext4_validate_encryption_key_si
 		return size;
 	return 0;
 }
+
+/*
+ * Validate dentries for encrypted directories to make sure we aren't
+ * potentially caching stale data after a key has been added or
+ * removed.
+ */
+static int ext4_d_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
+{
+	struct inode *dir = d_inode(dentry->d_parent);
+	struct ext4_crypt_info *ci = EXT4_I(dir)->i_crypt_info;
+	int dir_has_key, cached_with_key;
+
+	if (!ext4_encrypted_inode(dir))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* this should eventually be an flag in d_flags */
+	cached_with_key = dentry->d_fsdata != NULL;
+	dir_has_key = (ci != NULL);
+
+	/*
+	 * If the dentry was cached without the key, and it is a
+	 * negative dentry, it might be a valid name.  We can't check
+	 * if the key has since been made available due to locking
+	 * reasons, so we fail the validation so ext4_lookup() can do
+	 * this check.
+	 *
+	 * We also fail the validation if the dentry was created with
+	 * the key present, but we no longer have the key, or vice versa.
+	 */
+	if ((!cached_with_key && d_is_negative(dentry)) ||
+	    (!cached_with_key && dir_has_key) ||
+	    (cached_with_key && !dir_has_key)) {
+#if 0				/* Revalidation debug */
+		char buf[80];
+		char *cp = simple_dname(dentry, buf, sizeof(buf));
+
+		if (IS_ERR(cp))
+			cp = (char *) "???";
+		pr_err("revalidate: %s %p %d %d %d\n", cp, dentry->d_fsdata,
+		       cached_with_key, d_is_negative(dentry),
+		       dir_has_key);
+#endif
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+const struct dentry_operations ext4_encrypted_d_ops = {
+	.d_revalidate = ext4_d_revalidate,
+};
--- a/fs/ext4/dir.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/dir.c
@@ -111,6 +111,12 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *fil
 	int dir_has_error = 0;
 	struct ext4_str fname_crypto_str = {.name = NULL, .len = 0};
 
+	if (ext4_encrypted_inode(inode)) {
+		err = ext4_get_encryption_info(inode);
+		if (err && err != -ENOKEY)
+			return err;
+	}
+
 	if (is_dx_dir(inode)) {
 		err = ext4_dx_readdir(file, ctx);
 		if (err != ERR_BAD_DX_DIR) {
--- a/fs/ext4/ext4.h
+++ b/fs/ext4/ext4.h
@@ -2268,6 +2268,7 @@ struct page *ext4_encrypt(struct inode *
 			  struct page *plaintext_page);
 int ext4_decrypt(struct page *page);
 int ext4_encrypted_zeroout(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_extent *ex);
+extern const struct dentry_operations ext4_encrypted_d_ops;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION
 int ext4_init_crypto(void);
--- a/fs/ext4/namei.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c
@@ -1557,6 +1557,24 @@ static struct dentry *ext4_lookup(struct
 	struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de;
 	struct buffer_head *bh;
 
+       if (ext4_encrypted_inode(dir)) {
+               int res = ext4_get_encryption_info(dir);
+
+		/*
+		 * This should be a properly defined flag for
+		 * dentry->d_flags when we uplift this to the VFS.
+		 * d_fsdata is set to (void *) 1 if if the dentry is
+		 * created while the directory was encrypted and we
+		 * don't have access to the key.
+		 */
+	       dentry->d_fsdata = NULL;
+	       if (ext4_encryption_info(dir))
+		       dentry->d_fsdata = (void *) 1;
+	       d_set_d_op(dentry, &ext4_encrypted_d_ops);
+	       if (res && res != -ENOKEY)
+		       return ERR_PTR(res);
+       }
+
 	if (dentry->d_name.len > EXT4_NAME_LEN)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
 

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-05-05 18:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-05-05 18:32 [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.67-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-05 18:32 ` [PATCH 4.4 01/20] timerfd: Protect the might cancel mechanism proper Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-05 18:32 ` [PATCH 4.4 02/20] Handle mismatched open calls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-05 18:32 ` [PATCH 4.4 03/20] ASoC: intel: Fix PM and non-atomic crash in bytcr drivers Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-05 18:32 ` [PATCH 4.4 04/20] ALSA: ppc/awacs: shut up maybe-uninitialized warning Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-05 18:32 ` [PATCH 4.4 05/20] drbd: avoid redefinition of BITS_PER_PAGE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-05 18:32 ` [PATCH 4.4 06/20] mtd: avoid stack overflow in MTD CFI code Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-05 18:32 ` [PATCH 4.4 07/20] net: tg3: avoid uninitialized variable warning Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-05 18:32 ` [PATCH 4.4 08/20] scsi: cxlflash: Scan host only after the port is ready for I/O Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-05 18:32 ` [PATCH 4.4 09/20] scsi: cxlflash: Fix to avoid EEH and host reset collisions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-05 18:33 ` [PATCH 4.4 10/20] scsi: cxlflash: Improve EEH recovery time Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-05 18:33 ` [PATCH 4.4 11/20] 8250_pci: Fix potential use-after-free in error path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-05 18:33 ` [PATCH 4.4 12/20] netlink: Allow direct reclaim for fallback allocation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-05 18:33 ` [PATCH 4.4 13/20] IB/qib: rename BITS_PER_PAGE to RVT_BITS_PER_PAGE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-05 18:33 ` [PATCH 4.4 14/20] IB/ehca: fix maybe-uninitialized warnings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-05 18:33 ` [PATCH 4.4 15/20] ext4: require encryption feature for EXT4_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-05 18:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2017-05-05 18:33 ` [PATCH 4.4 17/20] ext4 crypto: use dget_parent() in ext4_d_revalidate() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-05 18:33 ` [PATCH 4.4 18/20] ext4/fscrypto: avoid RCU lookup in d_revalidate Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-05 18:33 ` [PATCH 4.4 19/20] nfsd4: minor NFSv2/v3 write decoding cleanup Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-06  1:58 ` [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.67-stable review Shuah Khan
2017-05-06  3:41   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-07 20:53 ` Guenter Roeck

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