linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
To: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] LSM: Make security_hook_heads a local variable.
Date: Mon, 22 May 2017 07:03:06 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170522140306.GA3907@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1495365245-3185-1-git-send-email-penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>

On Sun, May 21, 2017 at 08:14:05PM +0900, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> A sealable memory allocator patch was proposed at
> http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170519103811.2183-1-igor.stoppa@huawei.com ,
> and is waiting for a follow-on patch showing how any of the kernel
> can be changed to use this new subsystem. So, here it is for LSM hooks.
> 
> The LSM hooks ("struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads" and
> "struct security_hook_list ...[]") will benefit from this allocator via
> protection using set_memory_ro()/set_memory_rw(), and it will remove
> CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS config option.
> 
> This means that these structures will be allocated at run time using
> smalloc(), and therefore the address of these structures will be
> determined at run time rather than compile time.
> 
> But currently, LSM_HOOK_INIT() macro depends on the address of
> security_hook_heads being known at compile time. But we already
> initialize security_hook_heads as an array of "struct list_head".
> 
> Therefore, let's use index number (or relative offset from the head
> of security_hook_heads) instead of absolute address of
> security_hook_heads so that LSM_HOOK_INIT() macro does not need to
> know absolute address of security_hook_heads. Then, security_add_hooks()
> will be able to allocate and copy "struct security_hook_list ...[]" using
> smalloc().
> 
> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
> Cc: Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com>
> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> ---
>  include/linux/lsm_hooks.h |  6 +++---
>  security/security.c       | 10 ++++++++--
>  2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index 080f34e..865c11d 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -1884,8 +1884,8 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
>   */
>  struct security_hook_list {
>  	struct list_head		list;
> -	struct list_head		*head;
>  	union security_list_options	hook;
> +	const unsigned int		idx;
>  	char				*lsm;
>  };
>  
> @@ -1896,9 +1896,9 @@ struct security_hook_list {
>   * text involved.
>   */
>  #define LSM_HOOK_INIT(HEAD, HOOK) \
> -	{ .head = &security_hook_heads.HEAD, .hook = { .HEAD = HOOK } }
> +	{ .idx = offsetof(struct security_hook_heads, HEAD) / \
> +		sizeof(struct list_head), .hook = { .HEAD = HOOK } }
>  
> -extern struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads;
>  extern char *lsm_names;
>  
>  extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 54b1e39..d6883ce 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
>  /* Maximum number of letters for an LSM name string */
>  #define SECURITY_NAME_MAX	10
>  
> -struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __lsm_ro_after_init;
> +static struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __lsm_ro_after_init;
>  char *lsm_names;
>  /* Boot-time LSM user choice */
>  static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] =
> @@ -152,10 +152,16 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
>  				char *lsm)
>  {
>  	int i;
> +	struct list_head *list = (struct list_head *) &security_hook_heads;

Eww, struct casts.  This whole security_hook_heads scheme stink,
even with the slight improvements from Tetsuo.  It has everything we
shouldn't do - function pointers in structures that are not hard
read-only, structure casts, etc.

What's the reason why can't just have good old const function tables?
Yeah, stackable LSM make that a little harder, but they should not be
enable by default anyway.  But even with those we can still chain
them together with a list with external linkage.

  reply	other threads:[~2017-05-22 14:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-05-19 10:38 [RFC v3]mm: ro protection for data allocated dynamically Igor Stoppa
2017-05-19 10:38 ` [PATCH 1/1] Sealable memory support Igor Stoppa
2017-05-20  8:51   ` [kernel-hardening] " Greg KH
2017-05-21 11:14     ` [PATCH] LSM: Make security_hook_heads a local variable Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-22 14:03       ` Christoph Hellwig [this message]
2017-05-22 15:09         ` Casey Schaufler
2017-05-22 19:50           ` Igor Stoppa
2017-05-22 20:32             ` Casey Schaufler
2017-05-22 20:43               ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-22 19:45     ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/1] Sealable memory support Igor Stoppa
2017-05-22 21:38   ` Kees Cook
2017-05-23  9:43     ` Igor Stoppa
2017-05-23 20:11       ` Kees Cook
2017-05-24 17:45         ` Igor Stoppa
2017-05-28 18:23           ` Kees Cook
2017-05-28 18:56             ` [kernel-hardening] " Boris Lukashev
2017-05-28 21:32               ` Kees Cook
2017-05-29  6:04                 ` Boris Lukashev
2017-05-31 21:22             ` Igor Stoppa
2017-05-31 13:55   ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-04  2:18   ` kbuild test robot

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20170522140306.GA3907@infradead.org \
    --to=hch@infradead.org \
    --cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
    --cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=igor.stoppa@huawei.com \
    --cc=james.l.morris@oracle.com \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp \
    --cc=sds@tycho.nsa.gov \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).