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From: Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com>
To: <keescook@chromium.org>, <mhocko@kernel.org>, <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>, <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	<sds@tycho.nsa.gov>, <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	<hch@infradead.org>, <labbott@redhat.com>,
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com>
Subject: [PATCH v6 0/4] ro protection for dynamic data
Date: Wed, 7 Jun 2017 15:35:01 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170607123505.16629-1-igor.stoppa@huawei.com> (raw)

Hi,
please consider for inclusion.

This patchset introduces the possibility of protecting memory that has
been allocated dynamically.

The memory is managed in pools: when a pool is made R/O, all the memory
that is part of it, will become R/O.

A R/O pool can be destroyed to recover its memory, but it cannot be
turned back into R/W mode.

This is intentional. This feature is meant for data that doesn't need
further modifications, after initialization.

An example is provided, showing how to turn into a boot-time option the
writable state of the security hooks.
Prior to this patch, it was a compile-time option.

This is made possible, thanks to Tetsuo Handa's rework of the hooks
structure (included in the patchset).

Changes since the v5 version:
- use unsigned long for  __PMALLOC_ALIGNED alignment
- fixed a regression where size in bytes was used instead of size in words
- tightened the update of the pools list during removal, by doing
  earlier the decrement of the atomic counter

The only question still open is if there should be a possibility for
unprotecting a memory pool in other cases than destruction.

The only cases found for this topic are:
- protecting the LSM header structure between creation and insertion of a
  security module that was not built as part of the kernel
  (but the module can protect the headers after it has loaded)

- unloading SELinux from RedHat, if the system has booted, but no policy
  has been loaded yet - this feature is going away, according to Casey.


Igor Stoppa (3):
  Protectable Memory Allocator
  Protectable Memory Allocator - Debug interface
  Make LSM Writable Hooks a command line option

Tetsuo Handa (1):
  LSM: Convert security_hook_heads into explicit array of struct
    list_head

 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h      | 412 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
 include/linux/page-flags.h     |   2 +
 include/linux/pmalloc.h        |  20 ++
 include/trace/events/mmflags.h |   1 +
 init/main.c                    |   2 +
 mm/Kconfig                     |  11 ++
 mm/Makefile                    |   1 +
 mm/pmalloc.c                   | 339 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 mm/usercopy.c                  |  24 ++-
 security/security.c            |  49 +++--
 10 files changed, 631 insertions(+), 230 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 include/linux/pmalloc.h
 create mode 100644 mm/pmalloc.c

-- 
2.9.3

             reply	other threads:[~2017-06-07 12:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-06-07 12:35 Igor Stoppa [this message]
2017-06-07 12:35 ` [PATCH 1/4] LSM: Convert security_hook_heads into explicit array of struct list_head Igor Stoppa
2017-06-07 12:35 ` [PATCH 2/4] Protectable Memory Allocator Igor Stoppa
2017-06-09 18:56   ` Laura Abbott
2017-06-19  7:12     ` Igor Stoppa
2017-06-07 12:35 ` [PATCH 3/4] Protectable Memory Allocator - Debug interface Igor Stoppa
2017-06-07 12:35 ` [PATCH 4/4] Make LSM Writable Hooks a command line option Igor Stoppa

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