From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752189AbdFJQBf (ORCPT ); Sat, 10 Jun 2017 12:01:35 -0400 Received: from mail.skyhub.de ([5.9.137.197]:34892 "EHLO mail.skyhub.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752086AbdFJQBc (ORCPT ); Sat, 10 Jun 2017 12:01:32 -0400 Date: Sat, 10 Jun 2017 18:01:19 +0200 From: Borislav Petkov To: Tom Lendacky Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, Rik van Riel , Radim =?utf-8?B?S3LEjW3DocWZ?= , Toshimitsu Kani , Arnd Bergmann , Jonathan Corbet , Matt Fleming , "Michael S. Tsirkin" , Joerg Roedel , Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk , Paolo Bonzini , Larry Woodman , Brijesh Singh , Ingo Molnar , Andy Lutomirski , "H. Peter Anvin" , Andrey Ryabinin , Alexander Potapenko , Dave Young , Thomas Gleixner , Dmitry Vyukov Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 14/34] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Message-ID: <20170610160119.bnx5ir5dj3i27igx@pd.tnic> References: <20170607191309.28645.15241.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> <20170607191539.28645.70161.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20170607191539.28645.70161.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> User-Agent: NeoMutt/20170113 (1.7.2) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Jun 07, 2017 at 02:15:39PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: > The boot data and command line data are present in memory in a decrypted > state and are copied early in the boot process. The early page fault > support will map these areas as encrypted, so before attempting to copy > them, add decrypted mappings so the data is accessed properly when copied. > > For the initrd, encrypt this data in place. Since the future mapping of the > initrd area will be mapped as encrypted the data will be accessed properly. > > Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky > --- > arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 11 +++++ > arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 3 + > arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 30 ++++++++++++-- > arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 9 ++++ > arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 5 files changed, 126 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) Some cleanups ontop in case you get to send v7: diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h index 61a704945294..5959a42dd4d5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h @@ -45,13 +45,8 @@ static inline void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr, { } -static inline void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data) -{ -} - -static inline void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data) -{ -} +static inline void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data) { } +static inline void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data) { } static inline void __init sme_early_init(void) { diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c index 2321f05045e5..32ebbe0ab04d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c @@ -132,6 +132,10 @@ static void __init __sme_map_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data, bool map) struct boot_params *boot_data; unsigned long cmdline_paddr; + /* If SME is not active, the bootdata is in the correct state */ + if (!sme_active()) + return; + __sme_early_map_unmap_mem(real_mode_data, sizeof(boot_params), map); boot_data = (struct boot_params *)real_mode_data; @@ -142,40 +146,22 @@ static void __init __sme_map_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data, bool map) cmdline_paddr = boot_data->hdr.cmd_line_ptr | ((u64)boot_data->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32); - if (cmdline_paddr) - __sme_early_map_unmap_mem(__va(cmdline_paddr), - COMMAND_LINE_SIZE, map); + if (!cmdline_paddr) + return; + + __sme_early_map_unmap_mem(__va(cmdline_paddr), COMMAND_LINE_SIZE, map); + + sme_early_pgtable_flush(); } void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data) { - /* If SME is not active, the bootdata is in the correct state */ - if (!sme_active()) - return; - - /* - * The bootdata and command line aren't needed anymore so clear - * any mapping of them. - */ __sme_map_unmap_bootdata(real_mode_data, false); - - sme_early_pgtable_flush(); } void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data) { - /* If SME is not active, the bootdata is in the correct state */ - if (!sme_active()) - return; - - /* - * The bootdata and command line will not be encrypted, so they - * need to be mapped as decrypted memory so they can be copied - * properly. - */ __sme_map_unmap_bootdata(real_mode_data, true); - - sme_early_pgtable_flush(); } void __init sme_early_init(void) -- Regards/Gruss, Boris. Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.