From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753062AbdFUCRD convert rfc822-to-8bit (ORCPT ); Tue, 20 Jun 2017 22:17:03 -0400 Received: from tyo161.gate.nec.co.jp ([114.179.232.161]:48335 "EHLO tyo161.gate.nec.co.jp" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752917AbdFUCRB (ORCPT ); Tue, 20 Jun 2017 22:17:01 -0400 From: Naoya Horiguchi To: "Luck, Tony" CC: Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , "x86@kernel.org" , "linux-mm@kvack.org" , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm/hwpoison: Clear PRESENT bit for kernel 1:1 mappings of poison pages Thread-Topic: [PATCH] mm/hwpoison: Clear PRESENT bit for kernel 1:1 mappings of poison pages Thread-Index: AQHS5tyAaBnlv7mAa0S/rZwYqfAS1qIuAw4A Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2017 02:12:27 +0000 Message-ID: <20170621021226.GA18024@hori1.linux.bs1.fc.nec.co.jp> References: <20170616190200.6210-1-tony.luck@intel.com> In-Reply-To: <20170616190200.6210-1-tony.luck@intel.com> Accept-Language: en-US, ja-JP Content-Language: ja-JP X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: x-originating-ip: [10.128.101.11] Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-2022-jp" Content-ID: <703F58796A775E4D9E4833B6EE7B71B9@gisp.nec.co.jp> Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8BIT MIME-Version: 1.0 X-TM-AS-MML: disable Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (drop stable from CC) On Fri, Jun 16, 2017 at 12:02:00PM -0700, Luck, Tony wrote: > From: Tony Luck > > Speculative processor accesses may reference any memory that has a > valid page table entry. While a speculative access won't generate > a machine check, it will log the error in a machine check bank. That > could cause escalation of a subsequent error since the overflow bit > will be then set in the machine check bank status register. > > Code has to be double-plus-tricky to avoid mentioning the 1:1 virtual > address of the page we want to map out otherwise we may trigger the > very problem we are trying to avoid. We use a non-canonical address > that passes through the usual Linux table walking code to get to the > same "pte". > > Cc: Dave Hansen > Cc: Naoya Horiguchi > Cc: x86@kernel.org > Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org > Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: Tony Luck > --- > Thanks to Dave Hansen for reviewing several iterations of this. > > arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h | 4 ++++ > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > include/linux/mm_inline.h | 6 ++++++ > mm/memory-failure.c | 2 ++ > 4 files changed, 47 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h > index b4a0d43248cf..b50df06ad251 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h > @@ -51,6 +51,10 @@ static inline void clear_page(void *page) > > void copy_page(void *to, void *from); > > +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE > +#define arch_unmap_kpfn arch_unmap_kpfn > +#endif > + > #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */ > > #ifdef CONFIG_X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c > index 5cfbaeb6529a..56563db0b2be 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c > @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > > #include "mce-internal.h" > > @@ -1056,6 +1057,40 @@ static int do_memory_failure(struct mce *m) > return ret; > } > > +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 > + > +void arch_unmap_kpfn(unsigned long pfn) > +{ > + unsigned long decoy_addr; > + > + /* > + * Unmap this page from the kernel 1:1 mappings to make sure > + * we don't log more errors because of speculative access to > + * the page. > + * We would like to just call: > + * set_memory_np((unsigned long)pfn_to_kaddr(pfn), 1); > + * but doing that would radically increase the odds of a > + * speculative access to the posion page because we'd have > + * the virtual address of the kernel 1:1 mapping sitting > + * around in registers. > + * Instead we get tricky. We create a non-canonical address > + * that looks just like the one we want, but has bit 63 flipped. > + * This relies on set_memory_np() not checking whether we passed > + * a legal address. > + */ > + > +#if PGDIR_SHIFT + 9 < 63 /* 9 because cpp doesn't grok ilog2(PTRS_PER_PGD) */ > + decoy_addr = (pfn << PAGE_SHIFT) + (PAGE_OFFSET ^ BIT(63)); > +#else > +#error "no unused virtual bit available" > +#endif > + > + if (set_memory_np(decoy_addr, 1)) > + pr_warn("Could not invalidate pfn=0x%lx from 1:1 map \n", pfn); > + > +} > +#endif > + > /* > * The actual machine check handler. This only handles real > * exceptions when something got corrupted coming in through int 18. > diff --git a/include/linux/mm_inline.h b/include/linux/mm_inline.h > index e030a68ead7e..25438b2b6f22 100644 > --- a/include/linux/mm_inline.h > +++ b/include/linux/mm_inline.h > @@ -126,4 +126,10 @@ static __always_inline enum lru_list page_lru(struct page *page) > > #define lru_to_page(head) (list_entry((head)->prev, struct page, lru)) > > +#ifdef arch_unmap_kpfn > +extern void arch_unmap_kpfn(unsigned long pfn); > +#else > +static __always_inline void arch_unmap_kpfn(unsigned long pfn) { } > +#endif > + > #endif > diff --git a/mm/memory-failure.c b/mm/memory-failure.c > index 342fac9ba89b..9479e190dcbd 100644 > --- a/mm/memory-failure.c > +++ b/mm/memory-failure.c > @@ -1071,6 +1071,8 @@ int memory_failure(unsigned long pfn, int trapno, int flags) > return 0; > } > > + arch_unmap_kpfn(pfn); > + We had better have a reverse operation of this to cancel the unmapping when unpoisoning? Thanks, Naoya Horiguchi