* [PATCH] random: Do not ignore early device randomness
@ 2017-06-26 23:30 Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; only message in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2017-06-26 23:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Theodore Ts'o
Cc: Arnd Bergmann, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Ingo Molnar, Andrew Morton,
Jessica Yu, Steven Rostedt (VMware),
Viresh Kumar, Tejun Heo, Prarit Bhargava, Lokesh Vutla,
Nicholas Piggin, AKASHI Takahiro, kernel-hardening, linux-kernel
The add_device_randomness() function would ignore incoming bytes if the
crng wasn't ready. This additionally makes sure to make an early enough
call to add_latent_entropy() to influence the initial stack canary, which
is especially important on non-x86 systems where it stays the same through
the life of the boot.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 5 +++++
init/main.c | 1 +
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 01a260f67437..23cab7a8c1c1 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -987,6 +987,11 @@ void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size)
unsigned long time = random_get_entropy() ^ jiffies;
unsigned long flags;
+ if (!crng_ready()) {
+ crng_fast_load(buf, size);
+ return;
+ }
+
trace_add_device_randomness(size, _RET_IP_);
spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
_mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, buf, size);
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index f866510472d7..6b2c3ab7d76b 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -497,6 +497,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)
/*
* Set up the initial canary ASAP:
*/
+ add_latent_entropy();
boot_init_stack_canary();
cgroup_init_early();
--
2.7.4
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
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