From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753199AbdF0Mug (ORCPT ); Tue, 27 Jun 2017 08:50:36 -0400 Received: from mail.linuxfoundation.org ([140.211.169.12]:43826 "EHLO mail.linuxfoundation.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753153AbdF0MuX (ORCPT ); Tue, 27 Jun 2017 08:50:23 -0400 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, "Jason A. Donenfeld" , Johannes Berg , linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org, Johannes Berg Subject: [PATCH 3.18 16/16] mac80211/wpa: use constant time memory comparison for MACs Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2017 14:49:53 +0200 Message-Id: <20170627124439.174584655@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.13.2 In-Reply-To: <20170627124436.634493038@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20170627124436.634493038@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Jason A. Donenfeld commit 98c67d187db7808b1f3c95f2110dd4392d034182 upstream. Otherwise, we enable all sorts of forgeries via timing attack. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Cc: Johannes Berg Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/mac80211/wpa.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c +++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "ieee80211_i.h" #include "michael.h" @@ -150,7 +151,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN; key = &rx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY]; michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic); - if (memcmp(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) != 0) + if (crypto_memneq(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN)) goto mic_fail; /* remove Michael MIC from payload */ @@ -771,7 +772,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(struct bip_aad(skb, aad); ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad, skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic); - if (memcmp(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) { + if (crypto_memneq(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic))) { key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++; return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; }