linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@suse.de>, "Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Michael S . Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"\\\"Radim Krčmář\\\"" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 21/26] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV DEBUG_ENCRYPT command
Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2017 15:02:58 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170724200303.12197-22-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170724200303.12197-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>

The command copies a plain text into guest memory and encrypts it using
the VM encryption key. The command will be used for debug purposes
(e.g setting breakpoint through gdbserver)

Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 174 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 174 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 933384a..75dcaa9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -6214,6 +6214,176 @@ static int sev_dbg_decrypt(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static int __sev_dbg_enc(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long __user vaddr,
+			 unsigned long paddr, unsigned long __user dst_vaddr,
+			 unsigned long dst_paddr, int size, int *error)
+{
+	struct page *src_tpage = NULL;
+	struct page *dst_tpage = NULL;
+	int ret, len = size;
+
+	/*
+	 * Debug encrypt command works with 16-byte aligned inputs. Function
+	 * handles the alingment issue as below:
+	 *
+	 * case 1
+	 *  If source buffer is not 16-byte aligned then we copy the data from
+	 *  source buffer into a PAGE aligned intermediate (src_tpage) buffer
+	 *  and use this intermediate buffer as source buffer
+	 *
+	 * case 2
+	 *  If destination buffer or length is not 16-byte aligned then:
+	 *   - decrypt portion of destination buffer into intermediate buffer
+	 *     (dst_tpage)
+	 *   - copy the source data into intermediate buffer
+	 *   - use the intermediate buffer as source buffer
+	 */
+
+	/* If source is not aligned  (case 1) */
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(vaddr, 16)) {
+		src_tpage = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!src_tpage)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		if (copy_from_user(page_address(src_tpage),
+				(uint8_t *)vaddr, size)) {
+			__free_page(src_tpage);
+			return -EFAULT;
+		}
+		paddr = __sme_page_pa(src_tpage);
+
+		/* flush the caches to ensure that DRAM has recent contents */
+		clflush_cache_range(page_address(src_tpage), PAGE_SIZE);
+	}
+
+	/* If destination buffer or length is not aligned (case 2) */
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(dst_vaddr, 16) || !IS_ALIGNED(size, 16)) {
+		int dst_offset;
+
+		dst_tpage = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!dst_tpage) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto e_free;
+		}
+
+		/* decrypt destination buffer into intermediate buffer */
+		ret = __sev_dbg_dec(kvm,
+				    round_down(dst_paddr, 16),
+				    0,
+				    (unsigned long)page_address(dst_tpage),
+				    __sme_page_pa(dst_tpage),
+				    round_up(size, 16),
+				    error);
+		if (ret)
+			goto e_free;
+
+		dst_offset = dst_paddr & 15;
+
+		/*
+		 * modify the intermediate buffer with data from source
+		 * buffer.
+		 */
+		if (src_tpage)
+			memcpy(page_address(dst_tpage) + dst_offset,
+				page_address(src_tpage), size);
+		else {
+			if (copy_from_user(page_address(dst_tpage) + dst_offset,
+					(void *) vaddr, size)) {
+				ret = -EFAULT;
+				goto e_free;
+			}
+		}
+
+
+		/* use intermediate buffer as source */
+		paddr = __sme_page_pa(dst_tpage);
+
+		/* flush the caches to ensure that DRAM gets recent updates */
+		clflush_cache_range(page_address(dst_tpage), PAGE_SIZE);
+
+		/* now we have length and destination buffer aligned */
+		dst_paddr = round_down(dst_paddr, 16);
+		len = round_up(size, 16);
+	}
+
+	ret = __sev_dbg_enc_dec(kvm, paddr, dst_paddr, len, error, true);
+e_free:
+	if (src_tpage)
+		__free_page(src_tpage);
+	if (dst_tpage)
+		__free_page(dst_tpage);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_dbg_encrypt(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, dst_vaddr, next_vaddr;
+	struct kvm_sev_dbg debug;
+	int ret, size;
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&debug, (void *)argp->data,
+			sizeof(struct kvm_sev_dbg)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	size = debug.length;
+	vaddr = debug.src_addr;
+	vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
+	dst_vaddr = debug.dst_addr;
+
+	for (; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = next_vaddr) {
+		unsigned long n;
+		int s_off, d_off, len;
+		struct page **srcpage, **dstpage;
+
+		/* lock the user memory */
+		srcpage = sev_pin_memory(vaddr & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_SIZE, &n, 0);
+		if (!srcpage)
+			return -EFAULT;
+
+		dstpage = sev_pin_memory(dst_vaddr & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_SIZE,
+					&n, 1);
+		if (!dstpage) {
+			sev_unpin_memory(srcpage, n);
+			return -EFAULT;
+		}
+
+		/* flush the caches to ensure that DRAM has recent contents */
+		sev_clflush_pages(srcpage, 1);
+		sev_clflush_pages(dstpage, 1);
+
+		/*
+		 * since user buffer may not be page aligned, calculate the
+		 * offset within the page.
+		 */
+		s_off = vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
+		d_off = dst_vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
+		len = min_t(size_t, (PAGE_SIZE - s_off), size);
+
+		ret = __sev_dbg_enc(kvm,
+				    vaddr,
+				    __sme_page_pa(srcpage[0]) + s_off,
+				    dst_vaddr,
+				    __sme_page_pa(dstpage[0]) + d_off,
+				    len, &argp->error);
+
+		/* unlock the user memory */
+		sev_unpin_memory(srcpage, 1);
+		sev_unpin_memory(dstpage, 1);
+
+		if (ret)
+			goto err;
+
+		next_vaddr = vaddr + len;
+		dst_vaddr = dst_vaddr + len;
+		size -= len;
+	}
+err:
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static int svm_memory_encryption_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 {
 	struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
@@ -6253,6 +6423,10 @@ static int svm_memory_encryption_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 		r = sev_dbg_decrypt(kvm, &sev_cmd);
 		break;
 	}
+	case KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT: {
+		r = sev_dbg_encrypt(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+		break;
+	}
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
-- 
2.9.4

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-07-24 20:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 89+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-07-24 20:02 [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 00/26] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 01/26] Documentation/virtual/kvm: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) Brijesh Singh
2017-09-05 17:21   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-05 21:39     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-05 22:06       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-06 16:41       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-06 20:54         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 02/26] crypto: ccp: Add Platform Security Processor (PSP) device support Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25  8:29   ` Kamil Konieczny
2017-07-25 15:00     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-06 17:00   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-06 20:38     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-06 20:46       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-06 21:26         ` Gary R Hook
2017-09-07 10:34           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-07 14:27   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-07 22:19     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-07 23:15       ` Gary R Hook
2017-09-08  8:22         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-08  8:40       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-08 13:54         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-08 16:06         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 03/26] crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) " Brijesh Singh
2017-09-12 14:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-12 15:32     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-12 16:29       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-13 14:17   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-13 15:18     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 04/26] KVM: SVM: Prepare to reserve asid for SEV guest Brijesh Singh
2017-09-12 19:54   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 05/26] KVM: SVM: Reserve ASID range " Brijesh Singh
2017-09-12 20:04   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-12 20:24     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-12 20:28       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 06/26] KVM: SVM: Prepare for new bit definition in nested_ctl Brijesh Singh
2017-09-12 20:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 07/26] KVM: SVM: Add SEV feature definitions to KVM Brijesh Singh
2017-09-12 20:08   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 08/26] KVM: X86: Extend CPUID range to include new leaf Brijesh Singh
2017-09-12 20:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 09/26] KVM: Introduce KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl Brijesh Singh
2017-09-12 20:19   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 10/26] KVM: Introduce KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REGISTER/UNREGISTER_RAM ioctl Brijesh Singh
2017-09-12 20:29   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-12 20:50     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-12 21:08       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 11/26] KVM: X86: Extend struct kvm_arch to include SEV information Brijesh Singh
2017-09-13 13:37   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-13 15:14     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-13 15:21       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 12/26] KVM: Define SEV key management command id Brijesh Singh
2017-09-13 13:45   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 13/26] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_INIT command Brijesh Singh
2017-09-13 15:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-13 16:23     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-13 16:37       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 14/26] KVM: SVM: VMRUN should use assosiated ASID when SEV is enabled Brijesh Singh
2017-09-13 15:37   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 15/26] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_START command Brijesh Singh
2017-09-13 17:25   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-13 18:23     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-13 18:37       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-13 18:58         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-13 21:02           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 16/26] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command Brijesh Singh
2017-09-13 17:55   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-13 19:45     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-13 21:07       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 17/26] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_MEASURE command Brijesh Singh
2017-09-14 10:20   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 18/26] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_FINISH command Brijesh Singh
2017-09-14 10:24   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 19/26] KVM: svm: Add support for SEV GUEST_STATUS command Brijesh Singh
2017-09-14 10:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-14 11:25     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 20/26] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV DEBUG_DECRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2017-09-14 11:08   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2017-09-14 13:32   ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 21/26] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV DEBUG_ENCRYPT command Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 22/26] KVM: SVM: Pin guest memory when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-09-14 14:00   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:03 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 23/26] KVM: X86: Add memory encryption enabled ops Brijesh Singh
2017-09-14 14:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:03 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 24/26] KVM: SVM: Clear C-bit from the page fault address Brijesh Singh
2017-09-14 14:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:03 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 25/26] KVM: SVM: Do not install #UD intercept when SEV is enabled Brijesh Singh
2017-09-14 14:56   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:03 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 26/26] KVM: X86: Restart the guest when insn_len is zero and " Brijesh Singh
2017-09-14 15:40   ` Borislav Petkov

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20170724200303.12197-22-brijesh.singh@amd.com \
    --to=brijesh.singh@amd.com \
    --cc=bp@suse.de \
    --cc=joro@8bytes.org \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mst@redhat.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=rkrcmar@redhat.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).