From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, "bo Zhang" <zhangbo5891001@gmail.com>,
Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>,
Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3.18 7/9] xfrm: policy: check policy direction value
Date: Tue, 5 Sep 2017 09:09:41 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170905070902.233560309@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170905070901.809390741@linuxfoundation.org>
3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
commit 7bab09631c2a303f87a7eb7e3d69e888673b9b7e upstream.
The 'dir' parameter in xfrm_migrate() is a user-controlled byte which is used
as an array index. This can lead to an out-of-bound access, kernel lockup and
DoS. Add a check for the 'dir' value.
This fixes CVE-2017-11600.
References: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1474928
Fixes: 80c9abaabf42 ("[XFRM]: Extension for dynamic update of endpoint address(es)")
Reported-by: "bo Zhang" <zhangbo5891001@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
@@ -3248,9 +3248,15 @@ int xfrm_migrate(const struct xfrm_selec
struct xfrm_state *x_new[XFRM_MAX_DEPTH];
struct xfrm_migrate *mp;
+ /* Stage 0 - sanity checks */
if ((err = xfrm_migrate_check(m, num_migrate)) < 0)
goto out;
+ if (dir >= XFRM_POLICY_MAX) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
/* Stage 1 - find policy */
if ((pol = xfrm_migrate_policy_find(sel, dir, type, net)) == NULL) {
err = -ENOENT;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-09-05 7:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-09-05 7:09 [PATCH 3.18 0/9] 3.18.70-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-09-05 7:09 ` [PATCH 3.18 1/9] i2c: ismt: Dont duplicate the receive length for block reads Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-09-05 7:09 ` [PATCH 3.18 2/9] i2c: ismt: Return EMSGSIZE for block reads with bogus length Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-09-05 7:09 ` [PATCH 3.18 3/9] cpumask: fix spurious cpumask_of_node() on non-NUMA multi-node configs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-09-05 7:09 ` [PATCH 3.18 4/9] CIFS: Fix maximum SMB2 header size Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-09-05 7:09 ` [PATCH 3.18 5/9] CIFS: remove endian related sparse warning Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-09-05 7:09 ` [PATCH 3.18 6/9] wl1251: add a missing spin_lock_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-09-05 7:09 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2017-09-05 16:46 ` [PATCH 3.18 0/9] 3.18.70-stable review Guenter Roeck
2017-09-05 17:11 ` Shuah Khan
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