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Date: Sun, 10 Sep 2017 23:38:34 -0700
From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
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Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Security subsystem updates for 4.14
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On Sun, Sep 10, 2017 at 10:02:42AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> We need to differentiate between policies and x509 certificates.  In
> the policy case, they need to be signed and appraised, while in the
> x509 certificate case, the certificate itself is signed so the file
> doesn't need to be signed or verified.

How about you take this sketch over - I don't know much about the
integrity code, and it seems like you actually wrote
kernel_read_file_from_path as well - so you're at least 3 times as
qualified as I am in this area..