From: "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org> To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, mcgrof@kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, linux-efi <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>, "AKASHI, Takahiro" <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> Subject: Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown Date: Wed, 8 Nov 2017 00:07:00 +0100 Message-ID: <20171107230700.GJ22894@wotan.suse.de> (raw) In-Reply-To: <1509660641.3416.24.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> On Thu, Nov 02, 2017 at 06:10:41PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > On Thu, 2017-11-02 at 22:04 +0000, David Howells wrote: > > Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote: > > > > > > Only validly signed device firmware may be loaded. > > > > > > fw_get_filesystem_firmware() calls kernel_read_file_from_path() to > > > read the firmware, which calls into the security hooks. Is there > > > another place that validates the firmware signatures. I'm not seeing > > > which patch requires firmware to be signed? > > > > Luis has a set of patches for this. However, I'm not sure if that's going > > anywhere at the moment. Possibly I should remove this from the manpage for > > the moment. Remove it for now. The state of of affairs for firmware signing is complex given that we first wanted to address how to properly grow the API without making the API worse. This in and of itself was an effort, and that effort also evaluated two different development paradigms: o functional API o data driven API I only recently was convinced that functional API should be used, even for commonly used exported symbols, and as such I've been going back and slowly grooming the firmware API with small atomic changes to first clean up the complex flag mess we have. Since I'm busy with that Takahiro AKASHI has taken up firmware singing effort but this will depend on the above small cleanup to be done first. I was busy with addressing existing bugs on the firmware API for a while, then company travel / conferences so was not able to address this, but I'm back now and I believe I should be able to tackle the cleanup now. Only after this is merged can we expect a final respin of the firmware signing effort. > Or reflect that IMA-appraisal, if enabled, will enforce firmware being > validly signed. But FWICT lockdown is a built-in kernel thingy, unless lockdown implies IMA it would not be the place to refer to it. It seems the documentation was proposed to help users if an error was caught. That error should cover only what is being addressed in code on the kernel. Luis
next prev parent reply index Thread overview: 151+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2017-10-19 14:50 David Howells 2017-10-19 14:50 ` [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells 2017-10-20 23:19 ` James Morris 2017-10-19 14:50 ` [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown David Howells 2017-10-19 17:20 ` Randy Dunlap 2017-10-19 22:12 ` David Howells 2017-11-07 17:39 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann 2017-11-07 22:56 ` David Howells 2017-10-19 14:50 ` [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down David Howells 2017-10-20 6:33 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 23:21 ` James Morris 2017-10-27 18:48 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-30 17:00 ` David Howells 2017-10-30 17:52 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-02 17:22 ` David Howells 2017-11-02 19:13 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-02 21:30 ` David Howells 2017-11-02 21:41 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-02 22:01 ` David Howells 2017-11-02 22:18 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when " David Howells 2017-10-20 6:37 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 23:21 ` James Morris 2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 05/27] kexec: Disable at runtime if " David Howells 2017-10-20 6:38 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 23:22 ` James Morris 2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 06/27] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot David Howells 2017-10-20 6:40 ` joeyli 2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set David Howells 2017-10-20 23:26 ` James Morris 2017-10-23 15:54 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-26 7:42 ` joeyli 2017-10-26 14:17 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-27 19:30 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-27 19:32 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-28 8:34 ` joeyli 2017-10-29 22:26 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-30 9:00 ` David Howells 2017-10-30 12:01 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-26 15:02 ` David Howells 2017-10-26 15:46 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-30 15:49 ` David Howells 2017-10-30 16:43 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-02 17:00 ` David Howells 2017-10-26 14:51 ` David Howells 2017-11-02 17:29 ` David Howells 2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 08/27] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down David Howells 2017-10-20 6:40 ` joeyli 2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 09/27] uswsusp: " David Howells 2017-10-20 6:41 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 23:29 ` James Morris 2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 10/27] PCI: Lock down BAR access " David Howells 2017-10-20 6:42 ` joeyli 2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 11/27] x86: Lock down IO port " David Howells 2017-10-20 6:43 ` joeyli 2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " David Howells 2017-10-20 6:43 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 18:09 ` Alan Cox 2017-10-20 20:48 ` David Howells 2017-10-21 4:39 ` joeyli 2017-10-23 14:49 ` David Howells 2017-10-25 14:03 ` joeyli 2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 13/27] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " David Howells 2017-10-20 6:44 ` joeyli 2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 14/27] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " David Howells 2017-10-20 6:45 ` joeyli 2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 15/27] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " David Howells 2017-10-20 6:45 ` joeyli 2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 16/27] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " David Howells 2017-10-20 6:46 ` joeyli 2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 17/27] acpi: Disable APEI error injection " David Howells 2017-10-20 6:47 ` joeyli 2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when " David Howells 2017-10-19 22:18 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2017-10-20 2:47 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 8:08 ` David Howells 2017-10-20 15:57 ` jlee 2017-10-20 23:00 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2017-10-23 14:51 ` David Howells 2017-10-20 16:03 ` David Howells 2017-10-20 16:43 ` jlee 2017-10-23 14:53 ` David Howells 2017-10-25 7:07 ` joeyli 2017-10-19 22:48 ` David Howells 2017-10-19 23:31 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2017-11-09 17:15 ` David Howells 2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 19/27] scsi: Lock down the eata driver David Howells 2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 20/27] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down David Howells 2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 21/27] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL David Howells 2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 22/27] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) David Howells 2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 23/27] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module David Howells 2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 24/27] debugfs: Disallow use of debugfs files when the kernel is locked down David Howells 2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 25/27] Lock down /proc/kcore David Howells 2017-10-21 2:11 ` James Morris 2017-10-23 14:56 ` David Howells 2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 26/27] efi: Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT flag to indicate secure boot mode David Howells 2017-10-21 2:19 ` James Morris 2017-10-23 14:58 ` David Howells 2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 27/27] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in " David Howells 2017-10-19 22:39 ` [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown David Howells 2017-10-23 14:34 ` [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down David Howells 2017-10-24 10:48 ` Ethan Zhao 2017-10-24 14:56 ` David Howells 2017-11-02 22:01 ` [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown Mimi Zohar 2017-11-02 22:04 ` Firmware signing -- " David Howells 2017-11-02 22:10 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-07 23:07 ` Luis R. Rodriguez [this message] 2017-11-08 6:15 ` AKASHI, Takahiro 2017-11-08 19:46 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-09 1:48 ` AKASHI, Takahiro 2017-11-09 2:17 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-09 4:46 ` AKASHI, Takahiro 2017-11-10 13:37 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-11 2:32 ` Alan Cox 2017-11-13 11:49 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-13 17:42 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-13 21:08 ` Alan Cox 2017-12-04 19:51 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-12-07 15:32 ` Alan Cox 2017-11-13 21:44 ` David Howells 2017-11-13 22:09 ` Linus Torvalds 2017-11-14 0:20 ` Alan Cox 2017-11-14 12:21 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-14 12:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2017-11-14 13:17 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-14 17:34 ` Linus Torvalds 2017-11-14 19:58 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-14 20:18 ` Linus Torvalds 2017-11-14 20:31 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-14 20:35 ` Linus Torvalds 2017-11-14 20:37 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-14 20:50 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-14 20:55 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-14 22:14 ` James Bottomley 2017-11-14 22:17 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-14 22:31 ` James Bottomley 2017-11-14 22:34 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-15 11:49 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-15 17:52 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-15 19:56 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-15 20:46 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-16 0:05 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-12-05 10:27 ` Pavel Machek 2017-12-07 23:02 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-12-08 17:11 ` Alan Cox 2017-11-10 1:46 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-10 13:45 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-13 18:50 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-13 19:08 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-08 20:01 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-08 20:09 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
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