From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752412AbdKNAVy (ORCPT ); Mon, 13 Nov 2017 19:21:54 -0500 Received: from www.llwyncelyn.cymru ([82.70.14.225]:36708 "EHLO fuzix.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752145AbdKNAVs (ORCPT ); Mon, 13 Nov 2017 19:21:48 -0500 Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2017 00:20:47 +0000 From: Alan Cox To: Linus Torvalds Cc: David Howells , "Luis R. Rodriguez" , "AKASHI, Takahiro" , Mimi Zohar , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Jan Blunck , Julia Lawall , Marcus Meissner , Gary Lin , LSM List , linux-efi , Linux Kernel Mailing List , Matthew Garrett Subject: Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown Message-ID: <20171114002047.5e3b94ad@alans-desktop> In-Reply-To: References: <150842463163.7923.11081723749106843698.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <14219.1509660259@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <1509660641.3416.24.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <20171107230700.GJ22894@wotan.suse.de> <20171108061551.GD7859@linaro.org> <20171108194626.GQ22894@wotan.suse.de> <20171109014841.GF7859@linaro.org> <1510193857.4484.95.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <20171109044619.GG7859@linaro.org> <20171111023240.2398ca55@alans-desktop> <20171113174250.GA22894@wotan.suse.de> <20171113210848.4dc344bd@alans-desktop> <454.1510609487@warthog.procyon.org.uk> Organization: Intel Corporation X-Mailer: Claws Mail 3.15.1-dirty (GTK+ 2.24.31; x86_64-redhat-linux-gnu) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Mon, 13 Nov 2017 14:09:10 -0800 Linus Torvalds wrote: > On Mon, Nov 13, 2017 at 1:44 PM, David Howells wrote: > > > > Whilst that may be true, we either have to check signatures on every bit of > > firmware that the appropriate driver doesn't say is meant to be signed or not > > bother. > > I vote for "not bother". > > Seriously, if you have firmware in /lib/firmware, and you don't trust > it, what the hell are you doing? Booting a computer 8) - does anyone trust firmware ??? That aside if you can replace the firmware with your own, and your own firmware compromises the system then you have a privilege escalation from CAP_SYS_DAC to CAP_SYS_RAWIO just as you do with unsigned modules (you can't load modules without lots of rights but who cares because you can simply use cp to put them there with lesser rights and let the kernel do it). Alan