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From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	keescook@google.com, hughd@google.com,
	Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>,
	Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
	David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>,
	Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>,
	aliguori@amazon.com, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	michael.schwarz@iaik.tugraz.at,
	richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at
Subject: [patch 56/60] x86/mm/kpti: Disable native VSYSCALL
Date: Mon, 04 Dec 2017 15:08:02 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171204150609.416845605@linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 20171204140706.296109558@linutronix.de

[-- Attachment #1: x86-mm-kpti--Disable_native_VSYSCALL.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 2636 bytes --]

From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>

The KERNEL_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION code attempts to "poison" the user
portion of the kernel page tables. It detects entries that it wants that it
wants to poison in two ways:

 * Looking for addresses >= PAGE_OFFSET

 * Looking for entries without _PAGE_USER set

But, to allow the _PAGE_USER check to work, it must never be set on
init_mm entries, and an earlier patch in this series ensured that it
will never be set.

The VDSO is at a address >= PAGE_OFFSET and it is also mapped by init_mm.
Because of the earlier, KERNEL_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION-enforced restriction,
_PAGE_USER is never set which makes the VDSO unreadable to userspace.

This makes the "NATIVE" case totally unusable since userspace can not even
see the memory any more.  Disable it whenever KERNEL_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
is enabled.

Also add some help text about how KERNEL_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION might
affect the emulation case as well.

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: michael.schwarz@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171123003513.10CAD896@viggo.jf.intel.com

---
 arch/x86/Kconfig |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2249,6 +2249,9 @@ choice
 
 	config LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NATIVE
 		bool "Native"
+		# The VSYSCALL page comes from the kernel page tables
+		# and is not available when KERNEL_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION is enabled.
+		depends on !KERNEL_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 		help
 		  Actual executable code is located in the fixed vsyscall
 		  address mapping, implementing time() efficiently. Since
@@ -2266,6 +2269,11 @@ choice
 		  exploits. This configuration is recommended when userspace
 		  still uses the vsyscall area.
 
+		  When KERNEL_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION is enabled, the vsyscall area will become
+		  unreadable.  This emulation option still works, but KERNEL_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+		  will make it harder to do things like trace code using the
+		  emulation.
+
 	config LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE
 		bool "None"
 		help

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-12-04 16:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 118+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-12-04 14:07 [patch 00/60] x86/kpti: Kernel Page Table Isolation (was KAISER) Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 01/60] x86/entry/64/paravirt: Use paravirt-safe macro to access eflags Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 12:17   ` Juergen Gross
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 02/60] x86/unwinder/orc: Dont bail on stack overflow Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 20:31   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 21:31     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 03/60] x86/unwinder: Handle stack overflows more gracefully Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 04/60] x86/irq: Remove an old outdated comment about context tracking races Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 05/60] x86/irq/64: Print the offending IP in the stack overflow warning Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 06/60] x86/entry/64: Allocate and enable the SYSENTER stack Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 07/60] x86/dumpstack: Add get_stack_info() support for " Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 08/60] x86/entry/gdt: Put per-CPU GDT remaps in ascending order Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 09/60] x86/mm/fixmap: Generalize the GDT fixmap mechanism, introduce struct cpu_entry_area Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 10/60] x86/kasan/64: Teach KASAN about the cpu_entry_area Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 11/60] x86/entry: Fix assumptions that the HW TSS is at the beginning of cpu_tss Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 12/60] x86/dumpstack: Handle stack overflow on all stacks Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 13/60] x86/entry: Move SYSENTER_stack to the beginning of struct tss_struct Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 14/60] x86/entry: Remap the TSS into the CPU entry area Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 18:20   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 15/60] x86/entry/64: Separate cpu_current_top_of_stack from TSS.sp0 Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 16/60] x86/espfix/64: Stop assuming that pt_regs is on the entry stack Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 17/60] x86/entry/64: Use a per-CPU trampoline stack for IDT entries Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 18/60] x86/entry/64: Return to userspace from the trampoline stack Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 19/60] x86/entry/64: Create a per-CPU SYSCALL entry trampoline Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:30   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 20/60] x86/entry/64: Move the IST stacks into struct cpu_entry_area Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 21/60] x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSENTER stack canary Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 22/60] x86/entry: Clean up the SYSENTER_stack code Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 19:41   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 23/60] x86/entry/64: Make cpu_entry_area.tss read-only Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 20:25   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 24/60] x86/paravirt: Dont patch flush_tlb_single Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 12:18   ` Juergen Gross
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 25/60] x86/paravirt: Provide a way to check for hypervisors Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 12:19   ` Juergen Gross
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 26/60] x86/cpufeature: Make cpu bugs sticky Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 27/60] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 23:18   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 28/60] x86/mm/kpti: Disable global pages if KERNEL_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 14:34   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 29/60] x86/mm/kpti: Prepare the x86/entry assembly code for entry/exit CR3 switching Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 30/60] x86/mm/kpti: Add infrastructure for page table isolation Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 15:20   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 31/60] x86/mm/kpti: Add mapping helper functions Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:27   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-05 16:01   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-07  8:33     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 32/60] x86/mm/kpti: Allow NX poison to be set in p4d/pgd Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 17:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 33/60] x86/mm/kpti: Allocate a separate user PGD Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 18:33   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-06 20:56     ` Ingo Molnar
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 34/60] x86/mm/kpti: Populate " Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 19:17   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 35/60] x86/espfix: Ensure that ESPFIX is visible in " Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:28   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 36/60] x86/mm/kpti: Add functions to clone kernel PMDs Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-06 15:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 37/60] x86mm//kpti: Force entry through trampoline when KPTI active Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-06 16:01   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 38/60] x86/fixmap: Move cpu entry area into a separate PMD Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-06 18:57   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 39/60] x86/mm/kpti: Share cpu_entry_area PMDs Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-06 21:18   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 40/60] x86: PMD align entry text Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-07  8:07   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 41/60] x86/mm/kpti: Share entry text PMD Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-07  8:24   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 42/60] x86/fixmap: Move IDT fixmap into the cpu_entry_area range Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 43/60] x86/fixmap: Add debugstore entries to cpu_entry_area Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-07  9:55   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 44/60] x86/events/intel/ds: Map debug buffers in fixmap Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 45/60] x86/fixmap: Add ldt entries to user shared fixmap Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 46/60] x86/ldt: Rename ldt_struct->entries member Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 47/60] x86/ldt: Map LDT entries into fixmap Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:33   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 22:51     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 48/60] x86/mm: Move the CR3 construction functions to tlbflush.h Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 49/60] x86/mm: Remove hard-coded ASID limit checks Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 50/60] x86/mm: Put MMU to hardware ASID translation in one place Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 51/60] x86/mm: Allow flushing for future ASID switches Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:22   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 22:34     ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-04 22:36       ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 22:47     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-04 22:54       ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 23:06         ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 52/60] x86/mm: Abstract switching CR3 Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 53/60] x86/mm: Use/Fix PCID to optimize user/kernel switches Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 21:46   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-05 22:05     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-05 22:08       ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-04 14:08 ` [patch 54/60] x86/mm: Optimize RESTORE_CR3 Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:08 ` [patch 55/60] x86/mm: Use INVPCID for __native_flush_tlb_single() Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:25   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 22:51     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-05 13:51       ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-05 14:08         ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-04 14:08 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2017-12-04 22:33   ` [patch 56/60] x86/mm/kpti: Disable native VSYSCALL Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 14:08 ` [patch 57/60] x86/mm/kpti: Add Kconfig Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 16:54   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 16:57     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05  9:34       ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:08 ` [patch 58/60] x86/mm/debug_pagetables: Add page table directory Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:08 ` [patch 59/60] x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Check user space page table for WX pages Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:08 ` [patch 60/60] x86/mm/debug_pagetables: Allow dumping current pagetables Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 18:02 ` [patch 00/60] x86/kpti: Kernel Page Table Isolation (was KAISER) Linus Torvalds
2017-12-04 18:18   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 18:21     ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-12-04 18:28     ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-05 21:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-05 21:57   ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-05 23:19     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-19 20:56 ` Andrew Morton
2018-01-19 21:06   ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-20 19:59   ` Thomas Gleixner

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