From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1754505AbdLGPdA (ORCPT ); Thu, 7 Dec 2017 10:33:00 -0500 Received: from www.llwyncelyn.cymru ([82.70.14.225]:57016 "EHLO fuzix.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753308AbdLGPc6 (ORCPT ); Thu, 7 Dec 2017 10:32:58 -0500 Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2017 15:32:09 +0000 From: Alan Cox To: "Luis R. Rodriguez" Cc: "AKASHI, Takahiro" , Mimi Zohar , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Linus Torvalds , Jan Blunck , Julia Lawall , David Howells , Marcus Meissner , Gary Lin , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Matthew Garrett Subject: Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown Message-ID: <20171207153209.5da771a9@alans-desktop> In-Reply-To: <20171204195155.GU729@wotan.suse.de> References: <1509660641.3416.24.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <20171107230700.GJ22894@wotan.suse.de> <20171108061551.GD7859@linaro.org> <20171108194626.GQ22894@wotan.suse.de> <20171109014841.GF7859@linaro.org> <1510193857.4484.95.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <20171109044619.GG7859@linaro.org> <20171111023240.2398ca55@alans-desktop> <20171113174250.GA22894@wotan.suse.de> <20171113210848.4dc344bd@alans-desktop> <20171204195155.GU729@wotan.suse.de> Organization: Intel Corporation X-Mailer: Claws Mail 3.15.1-dirty (GTK+ 2.24.31; x86_64-redhat-linux-gnu) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Archived-At: List-Archive: List-Post: > I am curious though, is the above notion of having hardware require signed > firmware an implication brought down by UEFI? If so do you have any pointers > to where this is stipulated? Or is it just a best practice we assume some > manufacturers are implementing? It's a mix of best practice and meeting the so called 'secure boot' requirements. In the non Linux space exactly the same problems exist in terms of trusting devices and firmware, building a root of trust and even more so when producing 'hardened' platforms. Some stuff isn't - USB devices for example don't get to pee on random memory so often isn't signed. Alan