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From: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
To: tglx@linutronix.de
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, dwmw@amazon.co.uk,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
	x86@kernel.org, arjan@linux.intel.com,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	jeyu@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v4] retpoline/module: Warn for missing retpoline in module
Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 15:50:28 -0800
Message-ID: <20180125235028.31211-1-andi@firstfloor.org> (raw)

From: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>

There's a risk that a kernel that has full retpoline mitigations
becomes vulnerable when a module gets loaded that hasn't been
compiled with the right compiler or the right option.

We cannot fix it, but should at least warn the user when that
happens.

When the a module hasn't been compiled with a retpoline
aware compiler, print a warning and report it in the sysfs
vulnerability files

For modules it is checked at compile time, however it cannot
check assembler or other non compiled objects used in the module link.

v2: Change warning message
v3: Port to latest tree
v4: Remove tainting
v5: Add changes from Thomas Gleixner, refactor checking,
use a separate variable
Cc: jeyu@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
 include/linux/module.h     |  9 +++++++++
 kernel/module.c            | 11 +++++++++++
 scripts/mod/modpost.c      |  9 +++++++++
 4 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 390b3dc3d438..8766e13efe80 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/utsname.h>
 #include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
 
 #include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 #include <asm/cmdline.h>
@@ -94,6 +95,20 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = {
 
 static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
 
+static bool spectre_v2_bad_module;
+
+#ifdef RETPOLINE
+bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline)
+{
+	if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE || has_retpoline)
+		return true;
+
+	pr_err("system may be vunerable to spectre_v2\n");
+	spectre_v2_bad_module = true;
+	return false;
+}
+#endif
+
 static void __init spec2_print_if_insecure(const char *reason)
 {
 	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
@@ -278,6 +293,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
 		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
 
-	return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled]);
+	return sprintf(buf, "%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
+			spectre_v2_bad_module ? " but vulnerable module loaded" : "");
 }
 #endif
diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h
index fe5aa3736707..b1cc541f2ddf 100644
--- a/include/linux/module.h
+++ b/include/linux/module.h
@@ -794,6 +794,15 @@ static inline void module_bug_finalize(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr,
 static inline void module_bug_cleanup(struct module *mod) {}
 #endif	/* CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG */
 
+#ifdef RETPOLINE
+extern bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline);
+#else
+static inline bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline)
+{
+	return true;
+}
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
 static inline bool module_sig_ok(struct module *module)
 {
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index de66ec825992..3c6e2d9231d3 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2855,6 +2855,15 @@ static int check_modinfo_livepatch(struct module *mod, struct load_info *info)
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_LIVEPATCH */
 
+static void check_modinfo_retpoline(struct module *mod, struct load_info *info)
+{
+	if (retpoline_module_ok(get_modinfo(info, "retpoline")))
+		return;
+
+	pr_warn("%s: loading module not compiled with retpoline compiler.\n",
+	mod->name);
+}
+
 /* Sets info->hdr and info->len. */
 static int copy_module_from_user(const void __user *umod, unsigned long len,
 				  struct load_info *info)
@@ -3021,6 +3030,8 @@ static int check_modinfo(struct module *mod, struct load_info *info, int flags)
 		add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_OOT_MODULE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
 	}
 
+	check_modinfo_retpoline(mod, info);
+
 	if (get_modinfo(info, "staging")) {
 		add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_CRAP, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
 		pr_warn("%s: module is from the staging directory, the quality "
diff --git a/scripts/mod/modpost.c b/scripts/mod/modpost.c
index 98314b400a95..54deaa1066cf 100644
--- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c
+++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c
@@ -2165,6 +2165,14 @@ static void add_intree_flag(struct buffer *b, int is_intree)
 		buf_printf(b, "\nMODULE_INFO(intree, \"Y\");\n");
 }
 
+/* Cannot check for assembler */
+static void add_retpoline(struct buffer *b)
+{
+	buf_printf(b, "\n#ifdef RETPOLINE\n");
+	buf_printf(b, "MODULE_INFO(retpoline, \"Y\");\n");
+	buf_printf(b, "#endif\n");
+}
+
 static void add_staging_flag(struct buffer *b, const char *name)
 {
 	static const char *staging_dir = "drivers/staging";
@@ -2506,6 +2514,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 		err |= check_modname_len(mod);
 		add_header(&buf, mod);
 		add_intree_flag(&buf, !external_module);
+		add_retpoline(&buf);
 		add_staging_flag(&buf, mod->name);
 		err |= add_versions(&buf, mod);
 		add_depends(&buf, mod, modules);
-- 
2.14.3

             reply index

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-25 23:50 Andi Kleen [this message]
2018-01-25 23:53 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-01-26 14:59 ` [tip:x86/pti] module/retpoline: Warn about " tip-bot for Andi Kleen
2018-01-26 17:51   ` Randy Dunlap
2018-01-27 13:40   ` Borislav Petkov

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