From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S932343AbeBSUZA (ORCPT ); Mon, 19 Feb 2018 15:25:00 -0500 Received: from www.llwyncelyn.cymru ([82.70.14.225]:60402 "EHLO fuzix.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S932098AbeBSUY6 (ORCPT ); Mon, 19 Feb 2018 15:24:58 -0500 Date: Mon, 19 Feb 2018 20:24:40 +0000 From: Alan Cox To: Benjamin Drung Cc: Ard Biesheuvel , Matthew Garrett , Jeremy Kerr , Matt Fleming , linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, Linux Kernel Mailing List Subject: Re: Read-protected UEFI variables Message-ID: <20180219202440.2e80dfbc@alans-desktop> In-Reply-To: <1518614486.4749.33.camel@profitbricks.com> References: <1518612748.4749.29.camel@profitbricks.com> <1518614486.4749.33.camel@profitbricks.com> Organization: Intel Corporation X-Mailer: Claws Mail 3.15.1-dirty (GTK+ 2.24.31; x86_64-redhat-linux-gnu) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org > If the UEFI is as secure as storing an unencrypted file on a hard > drive, I am satisfied. Or do you have a better idea where to store the > SSH keys for a diskless system that boots via network? Store them in the TPM ? If you are booting over a network and not doing some kind of TPM based trusted boot check you already lost to a network attacker Alan